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Abstract
Essays on the Economics of Education and Market Design
Thi Hoang Lan Nguyen
This dissertation consists of three essays on the economics of education and market de-
sign. The first two chapters are united in their attention on school choice issues. Chapter 1
considers a specific application, whereas chapter 2 focuses on a matching mechanism widely
used in multiple applications. Both chapters 1 and 3 explore equity concerns in education
but through very different lenses (affirmative action vs. educational investment) and very
different settings (the United States vs. Vietnam).
Chapter 1 addresses the diversity issue that is especially prevalent in elite schools that se-
lect students based on exams. Whereas previous studies only consider the direct impact on
elite schools, I quantify the effects of two widely-discussed affirmative action plans on both
elite and regular schools in New York City. I find that the two plans have quite different ef-
fects. First, there is a trade-off between improving diversity and maintaining student quality
in elite schools as measured by state test scores in middle school. Despite taking into account
the socioeconomic status of students’ neighborhoods, the Chicago plan gives rise mostly to
reshuffling within elite schools. Thus, both the overall racial composition and quality of in-
coming students are largely preserved as in the status quo. In contrast, the Top 7% plan,
which would accept into the elite sector students in the top 7% by academic performance
of each public middle school, causes considerable flows of students between the elite and
regular sectors. The elite sector experiences a substantial increase in the proportions of Black
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and Hispanic students, along with a decrease in average student quality. Analyzing the dif-
ference between the outcomes of these two policies provides some insight into how the two
objectives—diversity and peer quality in elite schools—might be better balanced in general.
The second difference between the plans arises because they transform the distribution of
diversity across schools in different ways. The Chicago plan reduces the differences among
schools within the elite sector, while the Top 7% plan reduces the gap in diversity between
the two sectors even as it increases within-sector dispersion. Both plans result in considerable
changes in school assignments in the regular school sector, thus affecting the average student
quality in these schools.
Chapter 2, joint work with Guillaume Haeringer and Silvio Ravaioli, uses a lab experi-
ment to study learning dynamics when participants receive feedback in centralized matching
mechanisms. Our design allows for two types of learning: to coordinate within the same
environment as well as to understand the underlying mechanisms. We provide additional ev-
idence to previous work that the majority of the deviations from truth-telling, the dominant
strategy in the Deferred Acceptance mechanism, are those that do not affect payoffs. Further-
more, by explicitly analyzing learning, we can confirm that at least some of the participants
learn about the optimality of truth-telling, and their departures from it happen primarily when
they face the same environment being repeated. Finally, we find that when learning to coor-
dinate, agents tend to retain their previous strategy when the payoff from this strategy is high.
This is suggestive evidence of reinforcement learning.
Chapter 3 documents the pattern of educational investments for high school students across
different demographics and their effects on performance on the college entrance exam and
in college. Survey data from Vietnam shows that high school students from higher-income
households have higher education expenditure and participation in extra classes (both at the
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extensive and intensive margin). Minority and rural students invest less than their non-
minority and urban counterparts even after controlling for income. Out of these invest-
ments, only extra classes during the school year education expenditure other than that on
extra classes are effective in increasing college entrance exam scores. In terms of college
performance, a higher entrance exam score leads to a slightly higher grade point average at
graduation, controlling for academic department fixed effects and investments in high school.
Neither education expenditure or participation in extra classes in high school show any sig-
nificant effects on college performance, except that already captured in the entrance exam
scores. I record multiple gender differences. Female high school students tend to receive
more investments. Even though they perform slightly worse on the entrance exam than their
male peers with the same investments, they perform better in college, given the same entrance
exam scores.
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CHAPTER 1: Predicting the Effect of
Affirmative Action Plans in New York
City Elite Public High Schools
1.1 Introduction
In recent years, the lack of diversity in schools has been a concern for policymakers. This
problem is particularly intense for selective “elite” public schools. For example, this aca-
demic year, Stuyvesant, arguably the most prestigious high school in New York City, initially
made 895 offers of admission, only 7 of which went to Black students (Shapiro, 2019). This
situation has prompted urgent calls for affirmative action policies that might allow more mi-
nority and low socioeconomic status students to enroll.
The effects of such policies could be quite complex as they would likely propagate through-
out the entire public high school system. Specifically, some seats in regular public high
schools might be freed up when policy beneficiaries leave them in favor of elite schools,
and they might be taken up by students displaced from elite schools. Previous studies have
abstracted from this issue due to the technical challenge of accounting for students’ choices
in two connected school systems. In short, they have overlooked the impacts of affirmative
action on those who would neither gain nor lose offers to elite high schools.
This paper addresses this challenge and quantifies the effects of affirmative action on both
elite and regular schools. I consider two widely-discussed affirmative action plans in New
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York City. The first has been put in place by the Chicago Public School District and takes into
account the socioeconomic status of students’ neighborhoods. The second was proposed by
New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio and would accept into the elite sector students in the top
7% by academic performance of each public middle school. The latter plan is reminiscent of
others in the country, such as those implemented at the college level in Texas and California.
I find that the two plans have quite different effects. First, there is a trade-off between
improving diversity and maintaining student quality in elite schools as measured by state
test scores in middle school. The Chicago plan mostly gives rise to reshuffling within elite
schools, which does little to increase the racial diversity of this sector as a whole but, at
the same time, preserves the quality of incoming students. In contrast, the Top 7% plan
causes considerable flows of students between the elite and regular sectors. The elite sector
experiences a substantial increase in the proportions of Black and Hispanic students, along
with a decrease in average student quality. Analyzing the difference between the outcomes of
these two policies provides some insight into how the two objectives—diversity and student
quality in elite schools—might be better balanced in general. The second difference between
the plans arises because they transform the distribution of diversity across schools in different
ways. The Chicago plan reduces the differences among schools within the elite sector. In
contrast, while the Top 7% plan reduces the gap in diversity between the two sectors, it
increases the dispersion within each sector.
One effect that both plans have in common is that they change the average student quality
in regular high school programs: more than half of these schools have higher student quality
than under the status quo, whereas the rest undergo decreases in quality. This is due to the
movements of students between the elite and regular sectors, as well as reshuffling within
the regular sector. This result confirms that not considering regular schools is a damaging
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omission in evaluating affirmative action policies.
In New York City, the elite sector includes eight specialized high schools, which are public
high schools that select their students based on the Specialized High School Admission Test
(SHSAT). In the 2011-2012 school year, White and Asian students made up about 85% of
specialized high schools, whereas Blacks and Hispanics made up only about 15% of these
schools. These percentages are out of proportion to those in the broader population.1
The key feature that facilitates spillover effects from specialized high schools to regular
schools is that the Department of Education (DoE) determines most school assignments in
two rounds: a “Specialized Round” and then a “Main Round.” This assignment procedure
begins after all students have already submitted their rank-ordered lists over both types of
schools (when applicable), and both rounds use these lists as inputs. The Specialized Round
selects students who get offers to specialized high schools and also provides each of them
with a regular school offer. These students are then allowed to choose between these two
offers. Based on their decisions, the availability of seats at regular schools is adjusted before
the Main Round is run to determine the rest of the regular school assignments.
I exploit properties of Gale and Shapley (1962)’s student-proposing Deferred Acceptance
(DA) mechanism—defined broadly to include cases both with and without restrictions on
the length of the rank-ordered lists—to inform my treatment of the link between the school
rankings that students submit and their true preferences. Following Abdulkadiroglu, Agar-
wal and Pathak (2017), my empirical strategy relies on weak truth-telling.2 Unlike strict
truth-telling, this assumption does not presume any particular preference relation between
1For instance, public middle schools comprised of 28% White and Asian and 71% Black and Hispanic stu-
dents.
2There is an alternative approach where this weak-truth-telling assumption is relaxed to allow for payoff-
irrelevant “mistakes” (?Fack, Grenet and He, 2019). However, this method is not applicable in my setting
due to the higher level of uncertainty students face, which I will discuss in more details in Section 1.5.
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unranked schools and the outside option of not attending any New York City public high
school (i.e., attending a private school or a school outside of the city). Specifically, weak
truth-telling includes two requirements. First, the order of schools in the submitted rank-
ordered list is according to true preferences, which is likely to hold for both specialized
high schools and regular schools as this is a dominant strategy in the student-proposing DA
mechanism. Second, ranked schools are preferred to all unranked schools. The latter may be
violated for regular schools, where students can only rank twelve out of nearly 700 programs.
When students are constrained to ranking only a strict subset of the schools available, it may
be optimal for them to drop some schools to which they are unlikely to be admitted to make
space for less-preferred schools where they have a better chance (Haeringer and Klijn, 2009).
However, the assumption may still be reasonable in this particular setting, given that only
14.6% of students ranked all twelve programs.
I devise a two-step estimation procedure to infer preferences between the two connected
school systems: specialized and regular. Within each system, given truth-telling, students’
rankings over schools give rise to a generalization of the standard discrete choice model in
which instead of choosing one single alternative, agents express preferences over multiple
alternatives. Such a model, especially one with logit errors, is well-studied.3 With two
systems, the lack of a universal ranking poses a problem in ensuring that the cardinalizations
of preferences for the two sets of schools are comparable. To address this, I make use of the
choices between elite and regular schools, which are observed for students with elite school
offers. In each step of the procedure, I estimate a rank-ordered logit model for preferences
over one set of schools via maximum likelihood. Estimation for regular schools is done first
so that the results can be used to normalize utilities for specialized high schools both in terms
3See, for instance, Beggs, Cardell and Hausman (1981) and Hausman and Ruud (1987).
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of location and scale. This normalization involves a modification of the standard likelihood
function to account for the regular vs. elite choice mentioned above.
The Chicago affirmative action plan assigns 40% of total specialized high school capacity
purely on merit. The rest are divided equally among each of four neighborhood tiers. In my
implementation of this policy in New York City, each student’s tier is the tier of his or her
zip code (assigned based on its median family income). I assume that those who wish to gain
admission to specialized high schools would still have to take the SHSAT, which would be
used as the criterion for merit seats as well as a tie-breaker among students of the same tier.
Meanwhile, the Top 7% plan involves abolishing the current admission test and guaranteeing
specialized high school seats for students in the top 7% of each public middle school in the
city, determined by their combined English Language Arts (ELA) and mathematics scores on
the Grade 7 state tests. I assume that these students would be asked for their rank-ordered lists
over specialized high schools, and schools would rank students based on the aforementioned
scores.
For the analysis of both counterfactual policies, estimates of the students’ underlying pref-
erences are used to simulate rankings that were not submitted in reality. First, students who
did not apply to specialized high schools did not submit rankings for them, but in the Top
7% plan, some of these students would be eligible for seats there, and thus, such rankings
are required to determine their school assignments. Second, we can only compare students’
preferences between specialized high schools and regular schools for those who received
specialized high school offers, and for each of these students, only between a specific pair of
specialized high school and regular school. In both counterfactuals, new comparisons arise
either when students receive specialized high school offers while they previously would not
have or when they obtain a different specialized high school offer than the one they would
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have received in the current system. These “missing” rankings are constructed using the sys-
tematic part of the utility function that I estimated from the aforementioned random utility
model; that is, a student is said to prefer one school over another in the constructed rank-
ings if they are expected do so on average across all possible realizations of the idiosyncratic
preference shocks.
Using the estimated parameters, I simulate both policies in the short run when prefer-
ences remain unchanged and find considerable differences in their effects. The Chicago plan
causes very little exchange of students between the two school sectors (approximately 9%
of total specialized high school capacity) but instead mostly gives rise to reshuffling within
specialized high schools. As a result, both the racial composition and student quality4 of spe-
cialized high schools as a whole remain relatively stable. Meanwhile, different specialized
high schools become more similar to one another. Concretely, for Stuyvesant and Brook-
lyn Latin (the two schools with the lowest and highest percentages of Blacks and Hispanics,
respectively), these percentages become closer, go from approximately 3% and 38% to 8%
and 34%. The Top 7% plan results in considerable inflows from regular public high schools
and vice versa (amounting to approximately 49% of the total specialized high school ca-
pacity), radically increasing the percentages of Black and Hispanic students in specialized
high schools while lowering the overall quality. Under this plan, the elite and regular sectors
become more similar in terms of racial composition, but within the elite sector, schools be-
come more different from one another (Black and Hispanic students making up about 19%
of Stuyvesant compared to 80% of Brooklyn Latin).
Despite differences in the volumes of flow between specialized high schools and regu-
4Quality is measured by combined scores on Grade 8 state tests, which are taken after the admission process
but before students enter high school. This measure is therefore distinct from the selection criterion of the
Top 7% plan.
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lar schools, under both the Chicago and Top 7% plans, many students who are not directly
affected—that is, they neither gain nor lose specialized high school offers—still experience
a change in their school assignments. Within regular schools, there is slightly more reshuf-
fling for Black and Hispanic students than for White and Asian students. Both plans induce
increases in average student quality in more than half of the regular high school programs
and decreases or no change in the rest. However, only some of these changes are statistically
significant. The Top 7% plan additionally changes the distribution of racial compositions in
such a way that there is a notable increase in the number of programs with very low per-
centages (0-10%) of Black or Hispanic students, a sign of increased segregation within the
regular school sector.
On the student level, changes in peer quality are heterogeneous across the students’ own
scores. Under both plans, those belonging to the lowest two score deciles in the population
of all public middle school students lose out in terms of peer quality, while those belonging
to higher deciles (fifth to ninth) gain better peers. The sizes of the increases for the latter are
either similar across plans or higher for the Top 7% plan. The two plans differ in the direction
of the changes when it comes to students in the highest-scoring decile, who experience an
increase in peer quality in the Chicago plan but a decrease in the Top 7% plan. The same
type of assignment changes (e.g., from specialized to regular high schools) under the two
plans can result in different experiences in terms of peer quality.5 For instance, under the
same label “always specialized high schools,” students who stay in specialized high schools
under both the status quo and the Chicago plan can be either better off or worse of in terms of
peer quality depending on their own scores, while those who stay in specialized high schools
5The full list of types that I consider includes: always specialized high schools, specialized to regular, regular
to specialized (offer gained), regular to specialized (better offer), different regular schools, same regular
schools (main round), and same regular schools (specialized round).
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under both the status quo and the Top 7% plan are always worse off.
Three main factors drive the differences in the outcomes of the two policies. First, the pool
from which students are selected into specialized high schools is much more restrictive in
the Chicago plan, where the students must have taken the SHSAT to be considered. On the
contrary, the Top 7% plan considers all aspiring high school students, and in fact, nearly half
of the students who are reassigned from regular schools to specialized high schools under
this plan (1280 out of 2666) did not take the SHSAT. Second, the two plans currently use
two different criteria to define “merit,” with the Chicago plan using the SHSAT and the Top
7% plan using Grade 7 state test scores. When I restrict the selection pool to specialized
high school applicants (for whom both types of scores are available) and compare a policy
that selects the top 7% of each public middle school based on state test scores versus one that
selects the top 7% based on SHSAT scores, the overlap in offers comprises of only 29% of the
total specialized high school capacity. Third, the policy outcomes depend on how students
are assigned into subgroups, either neighborhood tiers in the Chicago plan or public middle
schools in the Top 7% plan. An affirmative action plan is more likely to promote diversity
if the subgroups being used have sufficiently different racial compositions, which is the case
for public middle schools. Meanwhile, a plan is more likely to maintain student quality in the
elite sector if student quality is sufficiently similar across subgroups, such as neighborhood
tiers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and
highlights my contributions. Section 3 provides relevant background on the New York City
high school admission process. Section 4 introduces the data sources and my descriptive
analysis. Section 5 describes the structural model, estimation procedure, and estimated pa-
rameters. Section 6 presents the effects of the two affirmative action plans and the policy
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implications. Section 7 concludes by discussing the paper’s key findings and avenues for
future research.
1.2 Related Literature
This paper makes several contributions to the literature on affirmative action in centralized
school choice, particularly that in selective public high schools. In doing so, it also con-
tributes in terms of empirical methodology to the emerging literature on divided enrollment
systems.
Among papers that evaluate affirmative action in selective public high schools, this is the
first that considers the indirect impact on regular public high schools in addition to the direct
impact on selective ones. In the same setting of New York City specialized high schools,
Treschan (2015) and Corcoran and Baker-Smith (2018) both simulate alternative admission
rules keeping the total number of offers in specialized high schools fixed. Due to data lim-
itations, neither study takes into account the students’ preference rankings over specialized
high schools, whether with or without the alternative policy. They treat all specialized high
schools as a single entity and only provide results in terms of offers, not actual enrollment. In
contrast, my paper accounts for students’ preferences over specialized high schools as well
as regular schools and finds two types of effects on specialized high schools that these studies
miss. First, a non-trivial share of students with specialized high school offers decline them in
favor of regular high school programs in all scenarios (status quo and alternative plans). The
affirmative action plans that I consider both reduce the fraction of such students compared to
the status quo by giving them offers to a specialized high school that they prefer over the spe-
cialized high school they would have been assigned before. Thus, even for specialized high
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schools as a whole, looking at offers instead of enrollment presents a consequential over-
sight. Second, by not considering assignments to specific specialized high schools, previous
studies also overlook the possible reshuffling within specialized high schools, an important
effect of the Chicago plan in my paper. In addition to neglecting some direct impacts on the
elite sector, these studies do not consider the impact on the regular sector, which I find to be
substantial in my analysis.
In terms of outcomes that are considered by both these authors and myself, Corcoran and
Baker-Smith (2018) offer a similar result for their Top 10% rule (based on grade 7 state
test scores and course grades) as my result for the Top 7% plan (based on grade 7 state test
scores). Specifically, both show substantial changes in specialized high school offers that
bring the racial composition of specialized high schools closer towards that of the population
of public middle school students but at the same time reduces average student quality. It must
be noted that Corcoran and Baker-Smith (2018) most likely understate the magnitude of the
decrease as the authors themselves admit that they measure quality by achievement in grade
7 state tests, which is part of the selection criteria. To assess student quality, my paper uses
grade 8 state tests, taken after the admission process but before students enter high schools.
This is a better measure because it is both independent of the admission process and more
recent. In contrast to the aforementioned results, Treschan (2015) finds that his proposed
policy slightly improves both diversity and student quality in specialized high schools. The
opposite result regarding student quality should be taken with a grain of salt because the
policy assigns all except for about 9% of specialized high school offers based on city-wide
rank in grade 7 state test scores, and student quality is then measured by the same tests.6 The
6The paper is unclear about which state tests are used for student quality, but given the lack of expressed
distinction between them and those used for selection, it is likely that they are the same.
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increase in “quality” thus follows by construction.7
Another paper on affirmative action in elite high schools is Ellison and Pathak (2016),
which considers the Chicago exam schools. However, their focus is on the efficiency of poli-
cies based on proxies for membership of the underrepresented group compared to policies
based directly on membership status, for instance, race-blind affirmative action policies com-
pared to race-based ones. To define efficiency, the authors assume that social welfare is the
sum of students’ expected educational outcomes, which, for each student, depends on the
student’s own type (ability and/or preparation), how well the school curriculum matches the
student’s type, and how well the composition of students in the school reflects the composi-
tion in the population. Using data from Chicago for the year 2013-2014, the authors evaluate
the efficiency of the current Chicago tier-based policy as well as some alternative policies
(including a Top 10% rule). The authors focus only on the two most selective schools. In all
policies, only students who did apply to elite schools are considered, which means submitted
school rankings are enough for counterfactual simulations, precluding the need for preference
estimation as in my paper.
My second contribution is to provide further empirical evidence to illustrate previous the-
oretical results regarding the importance of precedence order, that is, the order in which the
school seats are filled in the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism in the presence of re-
served seats such as the tier seats in the Chicago plan. In fact, this plan directly inspires Dur,
Pathak and Sonmez (2016)’s theoretical model, which is simplified to a single school setting.
The authors show that even with a tier-blind precedence order—where tiers are treated as
anonymous, and thus, none is explicitly favored—one can still exploit the statistical prop-
7This problem is of greater concern here than in Corcoran and Baker-Smith (2018), where top students from
each middle school are selected instead of city-wide.
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erties of the scores to generate (dis)advantageous allocations to certain tier(s). Specifically,
assuming that the school is oversubscribed, the precedence order where all merit seats are
filled before all tier seats is the best tier-blind precedence for the tier with the worst distri-
bution of scores, and the worst tier-blind precedence for the tier with the best distribution of
scores.8 The opposite is true for the precedence order where all tier seats are filled before
all merit seats. My empirical analysis in the multiple-school setting of New York City spe-
cialized high schools gives similar results to that by Dur, Pathak and Sonmez (2016) of the
Chicago exam schools and supports their theoretical results. Dur et al. (2017) instead focus
on the effect of the change in the size of the reserve compared to the change in the precedence
order. Theoretically, increasing the size of the reserve and moving non-reserve seats up in the
precedence order both weakly increase the number of reserve-eligible students admitted. In
their empirical analysis of the Boston Public School system, the effects of these two different
adjustments are quantitatively similar. In this paper, I also find that moving (non-reserve)
merit seats up in the precedence order can be as effective as increasing the number of tier
seats (the reserve).
My third contribution is to show empirical evidence of the effect of affirmative action in
a real-life setting. This complements the theoretical literature on affirmative action under
different centralized school choice mechanisms, which is mostly agnostic when it comes to
the effect of affirmative action under specific conditions. Both Kojima (2012)’s and Dogan
(2016)’s theoretical results show that there exist students’ preference profiles under which
more affirmative action can hurt the minority that it aims to help. Dogan (2016) points out
that this problem is because for some minority students, being treated as a minority does not
8“Worst” (“best”) in the sense that at every possible score, they have the lowest (highest) representation among
all tiers.
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affect their own outcomes, but it can negatively affect the outcomes for other minority stu-
dents. Thus, the author proposes an alternative mechanism where this problem is alleviated.
Although the type of affirmative action he considers is different, a similar insight applies
to the Chicago plan. Specifically, having merit seats filled last is bad for the disadvantaged
tier as mentioned above because high-achieving students in this tier, who would have been
admitted purely on merit, end up filling tier seats, leaving their lower-achieving peers to com-
pete for merit seats. It must be noted, however, that both Kojima (2012) and Dogan (2016)
are silent on what would happen under specific students’ preference profiles (such as those
occurring in practice). My empirical results demonstrate that in New York City, affirmative
action policies do help more students in disadvantaged groups gain access to specialized high
schools.
In terms of methodology, I devise an estimation procedure to handle the two connected
school systems in New York City, thus contributing to the literature on divided enrollment
systems that has been mostly theoretical until now.9 Divided enrollment systems refer to
school systems in which students may apply to and receive offers of admission from multi-
ple groups of schools, which conduct their admission processes separately. Manjunatha and
Turhan (2016) show that this can lead to wastefulness in the sense that many students may
not receive offers despite seats still being available in some schools. They propose an itera-
tive mechanism in which these different groups can each independently match and re-match
students to its schools to alleviate this problem while accounting for schools’ priorities. This
process is demonstrated to Pareto-improve the outcome in every iteration and arrive at a non-
9Hahm (2019) also estimates students’ preferences for these two connected school systems, but in order to
answer a different research question. As such, the author focuses his analysis only on specialized high
school applicants. In terms of estimation strategy, he uses the choice between specialized high schools and
regular school programs to create a global ranking for each student, and thus, preferences for both types of
schools are estimated jointly.
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wasteful outcome in a finite number of iterations. Turhan (2019) studies the effects of the
partition structure—in other words, how schools are divided into groups—on the properties
of the aforementioned mechanism. He finds that students’ welfare increases and the mecha-
nism becomes less manipulable as the partition becomes coarser. Dogan and Yenmez (2018)
prove that given substitutable school priorities, a unified system, where each student submits
one ranking over all schools and receives at most one school offer, achieves an outcome that
(weakly) Pareto dominates that from a divided system. They also characterize three different
sources of inefficiency in the divided system. My setting involves the coarsest possible par-
tition short of unification, and while it does not use Manjunatha and Turhan (2016)’s mecha-
nism, some waste is reduced when the DA mechanism is re-run for regular schools. The first
source of inefficiency identified by Dogan and Yenmez (2018) is evidenced in the fact that
declined specialized high school offers are not re-distributed. I show that under affirmative
action plans, this waste is lessened when more students choose specialized high schools over
regular schools.
Finally, this research is also related to the literature on affirmative action in the decentral-
ized higher education markets, particularly Kapor (2016)’s paper on Texas Top Ten, which
guarantees admission to Texas public universities for students in the top ten percent of their
high school class. The paper finds that Texas Top Ten has a substantial effect on admis-
sion for all students due to displacement effects, like in my setting. The author considers a
counterfactual where there is no affirmative action. In such a scenario, attendance at flagship
universities decreased by 10% for Black and Hispanics students compared to under Texas Top
Ten, but increases by 17% for students from affluent high schools. Entering students under
Texas Top Ten or in its absence perform similarly in their first- and second- year GPA in col-
lege. In summary, Texas Top Ten improves diversity without compromising the educational
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outcomes of admitted students.10
1.3 New York City Public High School Admission
Middle-school students in NYC have two public high school options: specialized high
schools and regular schools. A key feature that facilitates spillover effects from special-
ized high schools to regular school admissions is that admission results for the former are
finalized first and thus affect admission to the latter. Private schools and schools outside of
the New York City school districts are also among possible options.
1.3.1 Application Process
Grade 8 students can be divided into two groups: specialized high school applicants and
specialized high schools non-applicants, that is, those who plan to apply for specialized high
schools and those who do not. The sets of actions that needed to be taken differ for these two
groups.
Specialized high school applicants need to go through a multi-step process. First, in Octo-
ber, they take the specialized high school Admission Test (SHSAT). The test includes two sec-
tions (verbal and mathematics) and can only be taken once.11 Testing locations are assigned
based on the geographic district of each student’s middle school. In 2010-2011, Queens bor-
ough had two test locations, and the other boroughs each had one. During the test, students
must express their preferences over the specialized high schools by filling out a rank-ordered
10For details on other papers in this strand of literature, Arcidiacono, Lovenheim and Zhu (2015) and Arcidia-
cono and Lovenheim (2016) provide excellent literature surveys.
11Strictly specking, students who fail to gain admission into specialized high schools can take the test again the
following year when they are in grade 9. However, the test result will be used for admission into grade 10
in specialized high schools, which is separate from the admission into grade 9 that I focus on.
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list (ROL) on the answer booklets. Each student must select one specialized high school as
the first choice, and then can additionally specify the second choice, third choice, and so on,
up to the eighth choice (i.e., ranking all eight specialized high schools) if he/she so chooses.
These lists will be used as an input to determine specialized high school offers. Second, in
December, they must submit their applications for regular schools, in which they can rank up
to 12 programs out of approximately 700. At this point, students know about the admission
methods of the regular school programs—which I will elaborate on in the next subsection—
but not their actual chance of getting into these programs. They also have not yet received
their scores for the SHSAT. Even if a student is not interested in any regular schools, this step
is necessary for receiving results from specialized high schools. Finally, in February, those
who qualify for offers from specialized high schools receive the aforementioned offer as well
as an offer from a regular school program. They will then need to choose among these two
options and the outside option of exiting the NYC public school system.
Specialized high school non-applicants go through a more straightforward process. They
only need to submit one application for regular schools in December, the same as in the
second step for specialized high school applicants. The ROLs from both specialized high
school applicants and non-applicants will be used as an input to determine regular school
assignments. Specialized high school non-applicants and specialized high school applicants
without specialized high school offers will receive one regular school offer after the admis-
sions for specialized high school applicants with specialized high school offers have been
set.
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1.3.2 School Assignment Procedures
The NYC Department of Education determines most school assignments centrally in two
rounds: a “Specialized Round” and then a “Main Round.”12 In both rounds, Gale and Shapley
(1962)’s student-proposing Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism, as defined below, is used.
In addition to students’ submitted ROLs described in the previous subsection, the DA
mechanism also takes schools’ capacities and schools’ strict priorities over students as inputs.
All specialized high schools have a common priority rule: students are ranked according
to their total scores on the SHSAT. For regular schools, different programs have different
admission methods ranging from generating priority based on a random lottery in unscreened
programs to evaluating each individual student based on criteria such as grades from the prior
school year, standardized test scores, attendance and punctuality, and interviews or essays in
screened programs. Programs that evaluate students individually are given a list of students
who include them on their ROLs and asked to return a priority ranking over these students
to the central enrollment office. Crucially, schools do not observe where they are ranked on
the students’ ROLs, so students do not have any incentive to influence schools’ priorities by
strategically changing their rankings.
Given the aforementioned inputs, students are matched to school seats using the following
algorithm:
Step 1:
• Each student proposes to her first choice school according to her submitted ROL.
• Each school tentatively accepts the applicants who have applied to it, one at a time,
12There are also supplementary rounds afterwards for those unassigned or unhappy with their assignment by
the end of the Main Round. However, these student only make up 14% of the total in application year
2010-2011.
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using the school’s priority list and starting with the applicant with the highest priority.
It does so until it has admitted as many students as its capacity or runs out of applicants.
The remaining applicants (if any) are rejected.
Step k > 1:
• Students who are rejected in the previous step apply to the next school on their sub-
mitted ROLs. If a student has already applied to all the schools in her ROL, then that
student remains unassigned (and the algorithm ends for that student).
• Each school considers the set of students it accepted at the previous step together with
the set of new applicants. From this larger set, the school tentatively accepts students,
one at a time, using the school’s priority list and starting with the applicant with the
highest priority. It does so until it has admitted as many students as its capacity or runs
out of applicants. The remaining applicants (if any) are rejected.
End: The algorithm ends when there are no new proposals; that is, either no one was rejected
in the previous step or all rejected students have exhausted their ROLs.
When students are allowed to rank all available schools, student-proposing DA is strategy-
proof for students; that is, it is a weakly dominant strategy for students to report their true
preferences (Dubins and Freeman, 1981; Roth, 1982).13 When they are only allowed to rank
a subset of schools, it is still a weakly dominant strategy to submit a truthful order of the
schools one does rank, but it may be optimal to drop schools (for instance, at the top of the
13Strictly speaking, these papers state the result for the marriage market, where one agent on each side is
matched to each other. In the school choice context where each school can be matched with multiple
students, this result holds if schools’ preferences over students are responsive—informally, schools’ prefer-
ences over sets of students can be completely described by their preferences over individual students—which
is the case in New York City high school admission.
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true preference ranking) to make space for worse schools where the student have a higher
chance of getting in. A more detailed discussion on how this affects my empirical strategy
can be found in Section 1.5.
In the Specialized Round, the DA mechanism is run separately for specialized high schools
and regular schools. Due to the common priority among specialized high schools, the mech-
anism is essentially reduced to a serial dictatorship where the serial order is from the highest-
to the lowest-scoring student. Specifically, the student with the highest score chooses her
first-choice school, then the student with the second-highest score chooses her highest-ranked
school among those with available seats, and so on. For regular school programs, priorities
vary depending on the admission methods described above.
The resulting assignments are sent out to those who received specialized high school offers.
Once these students have made their choices between their specialized high school offer and
regular school offer, their assignments are finalized, they are removed from the system, and
the numbers of remaining seats in regular school programs are adjusted accordingly. Then,
the DOE proceeds to the Main Round, where DA is run again for the remaining students and
regular school seats.
1.4 Data and Descriptive Analysis
1.4.1 Students
I link together three data sets from the New York City Department of Education containing
the universe of students who applied to any public high schools during the 2010-2011 ap-
plication year. The New York City High School Admission Process data contains all high
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school applicants with information on their zip codes, middle schools, scores on the Grade
7 English Language Arts (ELA) and mathematics state tests, submitted rank-ordered lists,
priority ranks, and admission decisions. The SHSAT data set contains a subset of the above
who applied to specialized high schools with additional information on the specialized high
school admission process. Finally, the June biographic data supplements the aforementioned
data sets with demographic information such as ethnicity, home language, eligibility for sub-
sidized lunch, etc.
I make two restrictions for the main analysis sample, which is described in this section and
used for the first step of structural estimation in Section 1.5. First, only students in New York
City’s public middle schools during the application year are included because demographic
information is not available for students in private middle schools. Second, I only consider
only those who appear in the Specialized or Main Round of the admission process. The
sample used for the second step of estimation, henceforth referred to as the specialized high
school sample, is a subset of the main analysis sample, restricted to only specialized high
school applicants.
Table 1.1 summarizes the characteristics of students in the main analysis sample as well
as the specialized high school sample. There is selection into applying to specialized high
schools in terms of all observable characteristics. On average, specialized high school appli-
cants score higher on the grade 7 state tests, come from more affluent neighborhoods, and
are less likely to be eligible for subsidized lunch. In terms of scores, specialized high school
applicants are doing better not only on average: Figure 1.4.1 shows that for the specialized
high school sample, there is a higher density of students at every score above 1330. The three
spikes on the right tail of each distribution are likely attributable to a property of the scoring
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Grade 7 State Math 672.7 695.03
(32.7) (28.7)
Grade 7 State ELA 661.5 677.7
(28.9) (33.0)
Zip code income ($) 54940 60211
(25705) (29001)






Notes: Statistics is based on the analysis sample, consisting of 66068 students. Zip code income is median
family income for each zip code from the American Community Survey 2007-2011.
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Figure 1.4.1: Distribution of State Test Scores - All High School Applicants vs. specialized
high schools Applicants Only
scale of the test.14 The percentages of White and Asian students among specialized high
school applicants are higher than those in the full sample, and the percentage of Black and
Hispanic students are lower. The differentials in compositions are especially pronounced for
Asians and Hispanics.
In terms of students’ choice, the amount of information I observe differs by student type
as defined by their actions during the application process. For specialized high schools non-
applicants (i.e., those who appear in the main analysis sample but not the specialized high
school sample), only their rank-ordered lists over regular school programs and regular school
14For both tests, the score increments are much smaller for the lower range of scores compared to that between
the top two scores (698 and 790 for ELA; 752 and 800 for mathematics), and there are bunchings at these
top scores. Therefore, from left to right, the three spikes in the distribution of combined scores correspond
to those who obtain the second-highest score in both tests, those who obtain the second-highest score on
one test and highest score on the other, and those who obtain the highest score in both tests. This is unlikely
due to the specific student population as test score data for other school years exhibit the same pattern.
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offers are available. For specialized high school applicants, I also observe rank-ordered lists
over specialized high schools. Among these students, some receive specialized high school
offers, which I observe along with their choice between their specialized high school and
regular school offers.
Table 1.2 describes the rank-ordered lists over regular school programs for all students in
the analysis sample. Regular school programs that are ranked higher tend to be closer to the
students’ home, have a bigger grade 9 cohort, higher percentages of White students, lower
percentages of students eligible for subsidized lunch, and higher percentages of admitted
students who performed well in the Regent exams. The type of schools (based on their char-
acteristics) that are included in the students’ ranking differ by their own race, their baseline
mathematics achievement as measured by their score on the grade 7 state test, and the median
family income of their neighborhoods. Details for this heterogeneity can be seen in Table 1.7
of the appendix, where average school characteristics by the rank of student choice are shown
for different subgroups.
From the observed responses between specialized high school and regular school offers
summarized in table 1.3, we can see that it is not an obvious choice. A considerable fraction
(19.08%) of students with specialized high school offers opted for a regular public school
instead. Out of these students, 70% got their first-choice regular school programs, suggesting
that the reason they applied to specialized high schools but did not accept their offers may be
due to uncertainty in their admission chance at their preferred regular schools.
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Table 1.3: Responses to Specialized High School Offers
Number Percent
Accept 3319 76.11
Regular Public Schools 832 19.08
Other Options 210 4.81
Total 4361 100
Notes: This table only accounts for offers to public middle school students, whom the estimation and counter-
factual simulations focus on. There are additionally about 1000 other offers to private middle school students.
1.4.2 Schools
School characteristics for 2009-2010, the school year before the application year, come from
the New York State Report Card Database publicly accessible on the New York State Edu-
cation Department website. Program descriptions are taken from the official New York City
High School Directory. Both types of information would have also been available for parents
and students at the time of application.15A few schools and, therefore, their associated pro-
grams have their characteristics censored due to the Department’s restriction on publishing
data for groups with fewer than five students. Table 1.4 summarizes the characteristics of all
high school programs for the 2009-2010 school year. On average, specialized high schools
have a higher percentage of White students, lower percentage of students eligible for subsi-
dized lunch, and markedly outperform regular high school programs in terms of their current
students’ achievement in the Regent mathematics exam.
15For school characteristics from the Report Card Database, there may be some slight difference between the
later version that I use compared to the initial version available at the time.
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Table 1.4: Program Characteristics for School Year 2009-2010
Regular HS Programs specialized high schools
Size of grade 9 430 464
Percent white 10.82 28.63
Percent subsidized lunch 71.21 42.00
High math achievement (%) 4.98 62.04
N 697 8
Notes: The high math achievement measure for each high school is the percentage of admitted students in said
school who score higher than 85% in the Regents mathematical exams in the 2009-2010 school year.
1.5 Estimating Student Preferences
To quantify students’ preferences in both the elite and regular high school sectors, I devise a
two-step estimation procedure, exploiting the choice between one elite and one regular school
that is observed for a subset of students.
1.5.1 Model and Estimation
Preferences over specialized high schools and regular schools both take the form of a random
utility model in which students with different backgrounds have heterogeneous tastes over
multiple dimensions of school characteristics. Although student preferences over the two
types of schools have the same functional form, I allow the parameters to be different to
reflect the fact that students may evaluate the characteristics of specialized high schools and
regular schools differently.
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Estimation step 1
The first step of the estimation procedure recovers the utility function for attending regular
school programs from the rank-ordered lists over these programs submitted by all students in
the analysis sample. Suppose s = 1, ...,S is a regular public high school program. Student








where xs denotes program characteristics, zi denotes students characteristics, and dis denotes
the distance between the student’s home and the school. Following the convention in the
school choice literature, I normalize the parameter for distance to -1 so that the unit can be
interpreted in terms of the disutility of traveling. The program fixed effect δs represents how
much an “average” student in the analysis sample16 values program s (disregarding traveling
distance). Parameters αmn capture how students of different backgrounds evaluate program
characteristics differently from the average. Peer preferences are captured by including racial
and socioeconomic compositions as program characteristics. I assume that these composi-
tions are uncorrelated to εis because the changes in preferences and, hence, behaviors of a
single student in a large market should not make a difference in the aggregate compositions.
Each student always has the outside option to exit the NYC public school system (e.g.,
16This student belongs to the omitted category for all dummies (White and not eligible for subsidized lunch)
and has characteristics that are equal to the average of the analysis sample for all continuous variables, which
means all zi are 0 in the standardized data. For a full description of such a student, see table 1.1.
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attend a private high school) with utility:
ui0 = λεi0.
In the above notation, Vis is the systematic part of the utility function. The idiosyncratic
preference shocks εis and εi0 are independently and identically distributed according to type
I extreme value distribution.
As in Abdulkadiroglu, Agarwal and Pathak (2017), the identification assumption I use is
weak truth-telling, which consists of two parts. First, the order of schools in the submitted
rank-ordered list is according to true preference. Second, ranked schools are preferred to all
unranked schools. Unlike strict truth-telling, this assumption does not presume any relation-
ship between unranked schools and the outside option of not attending any New York City
public high school (i.e., attending a private school or a school outside of the city).
Given this assumption, the validity of which will be discussed later in this section, one
can derive the likelihood of the observed data as follows. For student i who submits a rank-
ordered list ri = (ri1, .., rik ), the individual likelihood is the probability of observing said
ranking:
Li(θreg) = Pr(ri)
= Pr(ui1 > ui2 > ... > uik > uij∀j 6∈ {1,2, ...k})
= Pr(ui1 > uij∀j 6= 1)×Pr(ui2 > uij∀j 6∈ {1,2})× ...
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where θreg = (δreg,α ,λ) is the vector of preference parameters. From the first part of the
weak truth-telling assumption, observing ri implies that the true utility ranking is ui1 >ui2 >
... > uik . From the second part of the assumption, the lowest-ranked regular high school pro-
gram k has utility uik > uij , where j represents indices of unranked schools and the outside
option. The third line follows from the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property
of the logit model, and the last line utilizes the analytical form of the logit probability.
Thus, the log-likelihood for a sample of I students, each faced with S+1 alternatives (S

















I estimate the parameters θregvia maximum likelihood and use the standard asymptotic
theory for the estimation of the variance-covariance matrix of the estimates.
Estimation Step 2
The second step of the estimation procedure recovers the utility function for attending spe-
cialized high schools from the rank-ordered lists over them submitted by specialized high
school applicants in the specialized high school sample. Suppose j = 1, ..., J is a specialized
high school. Student i’s utility of attending specialized high schools j is:




βmnxjmzin−γdij + λ̂εij , (1.5.2)
with notations being similar to equation (1.5.1).
For utilities for the two types of schools to be comparable, their normalizations should
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be compatible in both scale and location.17 To ensure that utilities are of the same scale, the
coefficient of the idiosyncratic preference shock in equation (1.5.2) is fixed at λ̂, the estimated
value of λ in the utility function for attending regular school (equation (1.5.1)). Given this
normalization, the coefficient of distance to specialized high schools −γ potentially differs
from -1 (that for regular schools). To ensure that utilities are comparable in terms of location,
I link the two sets of utilities by the comparison of utilities between one specialized high
school and one regular school. For students who are allowed to choose between a specialized
high school offer and a regular school match, these two schools are used, and the ranking
is based on the student’s enrollment decision. For students who do not have the opportunity
to choose, I assume that they prefer their highest-ranked specialized high schools to their
lowest-ranked regular school. Otherwise, for this student, all ranked regular schools must
have been better than all specialized high schools, which means they would not have applied
to specialized high schools in the first place given any non-negative cost of application.
For student i who submits a rank-ordered list ri = (ri1, .., rik ) over specialized high schools
and chooses specialized high schools m over regular program s, the individual likelihood is
now the probability of simultaneously observing said rank-order list and choice:
Li(θSHS, θ̂reg) = Pr(ri and uim > uis)






















where V̂is is the systematic part of the utility of attending regular program s, evaluated at the
17This is because given an ordinal ranking, cardinal utilities are only identified up to an affine transformation.
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estimated θ̂reg. We can take the product of unconditional probabilities as in the second line
due to the IIA property of the logit model. The first part of the product is derived, under the
assumption of weak truth-telling, in a similar fashion to that in the regular school case, and
the second part is the logit probability of choosing m over s.
Symmetrically, if student i chooses regular program s over specialized high schoolsm, her
individual likelihood would be:





















The log-likelihood for a sample of I students, where i chooses specialized high schools mi
for i= 1, ..,n and h choose regular program sh for h= n+1, ..., I, is:




































I also estimate the parameters θSHS via maximum likelihood. In computing the standard
errors for the estimated parameters θ̂SHS , I need to account for the fact that the estimates from
the first step are used as an input. Thus, I take independent and identically distributed draws
from the distribution of θ̂reg and re-estimate the second step for each draw. The resulting
distribution of θ̂SHS is used to calculate its standard errors.
The Validity of Weak Truth-telling Assumption
As previously stated in the description of the student-proposing Deferred Acceptance (DA)
mechanism, when students are allowed to rank all available schools as is the case for special-
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ized high schools, it is a weakly dominant strategy for students to report their true preferences
(strict truth-telling). Consequently, both parts of the weak truth-telling assumption are likely
to hold for specialized high schools. Reporting the correct order among those that are ranked
(part 1 of weak truth-telling) is still a dominant strategy when the length of the rank-ordered
list is restricted as in the case for regular school programs. However, because students can
only rank twelve out of nearly 700 programs, the second part may be violated because it
may be optimal for students to drop some schools that they are unlikely to get in to make
space for less-preferred schools where they have a better chance (Haeringer and Klijn, 2009).
Only 14.61 % of students ranked all twelve choices, which somewhat alleviates concerns
over students dropping true top choice(s) due to restricted rank-ordered lists.
The possibility of payoff-insignificant mistake as introduced by ?, that is, students drop-
ping schools they are unlikely to get in even when they still have space for them in the
rank-ordered list, is still present for both types of schools. It must be noted, however, that
there is more uncertainty in admission chances in my setting compared to the empirical set-
ting of their paper, where priority is based on a score and students already know their own
score before submitting rank-ordered lists. Although specialized high schools also use one
single score to determine priority, specialized high school applicants have to submit their
rank-ordered lists before learning their own scores. Yet more uncertainty is present for reg-
ular school programs, some of which based priority on a lottery. Even for those which have
deterministic criteria for assigning priority like screened programs, how these different crite-
ria are weighed is somewhat opaque from the students’ perspective.
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Figure 1.5.1: Distribution of Estimated Fixed Effects for Regular High School Programs
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1.5.2 Preference Estimates
The distribution of estimated program fixed effects shown in figure 1.5.1 looks approximately
normal. As expected, the mean fixed effect for specialized high schools falls within the right
tail of this distribution, demonstrating the fact that these elite schools are highly valued. There
is some small mass of programs around as well as above this point in accordance with the
observation in Section 1.4 that there exist regular high school programs that are preferred to
some specialized high schools.
The estimates for the coefficients of the utility functions for both regular high school pro-
grams and specialized high schools are reported in Table 1.8. In both estimations, schools’
characteristics are centered around the average characteristics of the population of regular
high school programs as seen in the first column of Table 1.4. Students’ continuous char-
acteristics are standardized based on the mean and standard deviation in the main analysis
sample. There are some notable patterns of differences between the coefficients for regular
school programs and specialized high schools. First, while students of all races tend to prefer
regular programs with higher percentages of White students, the opposite is true for special-
ized high schools, although it is only significant for Hispanics and students in the other race
category.18 Second, the effects of the size of grade 9 are reversed for students of all races
except Black. Third, although regular school programs tend to be more attractive to students
with higher baseline achievement in both ELA and mathematics, the corresponding effect is
only significant for students with higher baseline mathematics when it comes to specialized
high schools.
18This category includes multiracial and Native American students.
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1.6 The Effects of Affirmative Action Plans
There are three main findings from my simulation of the affirmative action plans currently
considered. First, there is a trade-off between improving diversity and maintaining student
quality in specialized high schools. The Chicago plan does poorly in terms of increasing
overall racial diversity but preserves the quality of incoming students. In contrast, the Top
7% plan increases diversity substantially at the cost of student quality. Second, the Chicago
plan reduces the differences among schools within the elite sector, whereas the Top 7% plan
increases these differences. Third, both plans also change regular school assignments and
thereby the student quality in regular high school programs.
1.6.1 Implementing Counterfactual Policies
I simulate the effects of each affirmative action plan in the first year that it is implemented,
using the estimated parameters presented in the previous section. The analysis is based on
two main assumptions. First, in this short-run scenario, I assumed that parents and students
are myopic with respect to the possible changes in the school characteristics, including the
composition of incoming students; that is, their preferences over schools do not change.
Subsequent versions of the paper will address the effects in medium- and long-run when
parents and students also adjust their preferences in response to the policy. Second, to recover
preferences over specialized high schools of students who did not apply, I assume that these
can be extrapolated from students who did apply with the same observables. Rankings are
constructed using the systematic part of the utility function; that is, a student is said to prefer
one school over another in the constructed rankings if they are expected do so on average
across all possible realizations of the error terms.
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In both counterfactuals, I run two rounds: Specialized and Main, as in the status quo. In
the Specialized Round, the selection rules are different for specialized high schools, leading
for different offers. For regular school programs, the Specialized Round proceeds in the
same way as in the status quo. Given the new specialized high school offers, students who
receive them are allowed to choose between one specialized high school and one regular
school program. If a student would have chosen between these exact same schools in the
status quo, his or her actual choice is used in the counterfactuals. If not, then I predict this
choice by comparing the systematic parts of the utilities of going to these two schools. Given
the difference in the outcomes of the Specialized Round between the counterfactuals and the
status quo, the inputs for the Main Round are different. However, the procedure remains the
same.
I assume that the capacities of specialized high schools used in the Specialized Round
under the status quo are maintained in both counterfactuals, but the total numbers of incoming
students, given their responses to specialized high school offers, can change. In particular,
although specialized high school offers fill up their capacities, some students decline these
offers in favor of other options. In the current system, there are no waiting lists dependent on
the number of accepted offers.19 I maintain this feature under the affirmative action policies,
which means if more or fewer students decide to accept their specialized high school offers,
the total numbers of admitted students under the counterfactual policies may indeed differ
from those in reality.
When considering the effects on regular schools, I assume that the specialized high school
19The current analysis does not consider the Discovery Program, which allows students belonging to disadvan-
taged who barely miss the cutoff to apply for conditional offers at specialized high schools. However, the
numbers of seats for this program are committed to before the entire application process and thus do not
depend on how many students accept their specialized high school offers.
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offers and choices between specialized high schools and regular schools (if applicable) do
not change for private middle school students. This is because there are no identification
numbers that allow matching private school students between the specialized high school and
regular school admission data sets. In both counterfactuals, since these students do experience
changes in specialized high school offers (or lack thereof), thereby influencing the school
assignments in regular schools, we can consider the current results with respect to the changes
in regular school admission as a lower bound for the actual changes. Because the number of
private school students being affected under the Chicago plan is much lower than that in the
Top 7% Plan, the extent to which this assumption influences the results is different for the
two plans. As such, we should view within-regular-school outcomes for the two plans as
two examples of the types of spillover effects that are possible instead of comparing them
head-to-head.
Chicago Plan
In the Chicago plan, some seats are assigned purely on merit, and some are reserved for
each of four tiers of socioeconomic status determined by students’ neighborhood. An imple-
mentation in NYC would still require those who wish to gain admission to specialized high
schools to take the SHSAT, which would be used as the criterion for merit seats as well as a
tie-breaker among students of the same tier.
I assume that 40% of total capacity at each specialized high school is set aside as merit
seats, and the remaining seats are divided equally among four tiers. Tier 1 student has the
highest priority for tier 1 seats, and so on. Similar to the current policy in Chicago, when
running the Deferred Acceptance mechanism to determine specialized high school offers, I
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fill all merit seats first, then tier seats.20 In theory, if the applicants in one tier run out before
the seats in that tier are filled, students from other tiers would be admitted, which means the
precedence order in which different tiers are filled is also important. In practice, all tier seats
are oversubscribed, so any precedence order among the four tiers gives the same result.
Tiers are determined based on students’ zip codes. For public middle school students,
actual zip codes are used. For private middle school students, individual zip codes do not ap-
pear in the specialized high school admission data, so the tier for each is proxied by assigning
his or her middle school the average tier of all specialized high school applicants from that
school. Each zip code is given a tier depending on its median family income. Tier 1 has
income in the lowest quantile compared to the rest of New York City; tier 4 has income in the
highest quantile. To avoid dependency on the population of students who submitted public
high school applications, income quantiles are calculated based on the population of families
in New York City in the American Community Survey 2007-2011.
Top 7 % Plan
In the Top 7% plan, I assume that academic performance is measured by the combined En-
glish Language Arts (ELA) and mathematics scores on the Grade 7 state test. The top 7% of
students in each public middle school based on this measure obtain automatic eligibility for
one of the specialized high schools. The specific school assignments among these students
are determined by running the Deferred Acceptance mechanism, using Grade 7 state test
scores as the criterion of the common priority of all specialized high schools. For the 3474
students who applied before, I use their submitted rank-ordered lists over specialized high
20In Appendix 1.9, I explore different precedence orders as well as different proportions of total capacity set
aside as merit seats. I find that filling merit seats first, as in the main specification, does in fact favor the
more disadvantaged tier(s).
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schools. For the 1280 students who never applied, I simulate their rank-ordered lists from the
estimated preferences of those who applied. After the top 7% public middle school student
have taken their seats, there are 652 seats (approximately 12% of the total capacity) left for
private school students. I do not consider the allocation of these seats due to two reasons.
First, the demographic information of this group is unavailable, thereby prevent me from
any conclusion regarding their compositions. Second, even if I establish their assignments in
specialized high school admission, they cannot be linked to regular school admission.
1.6.2 Students’ Movements
The Chicago plan causes reshuffling within specialized high schools but little flow of stu-
dents between specialized high schools and regular schools, whereas the Top 7% plan causes
considerable flows of students between specialized high schools and regular schools. In both
cases, the exchange of students between the two sectors also results in extensive changes in
regular school assignments for those who neither gain nor lose specialized high school offers.
As shown in table 1.5, there are considerably more exchanges of students between the
elite and regular sectors under the Top 7% plan. The second row for each plan corresponds
to the proportions of students out of all those from public middle schools who move from
specialized high schools to regular schools. Under both policies, only small fractions of Black
and Hispanic students lose access to specialized high schools (0.08% and 0.05% for Chicago,
and 0.56% and 0.49% for Top 7%) contrasted with considerably more movement of White
and Asian students. However, the plans differ starkly in terms of the magnitude of the flows of
these students from specialized high schools to regular schools: approximately 11 times more
White students and 22 times more Asian students are displaced from specialized high schools
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Table 1.5: Comparison of School Assignments between the status quo and Affirmative Action
Plans
White Asian Black Hispanic
School Assignments - status quo vs. Chicago Plan (% of total)
Always specialized high schools 8.43 20.23 0.90 0.84
Specialized to regular 0.57 0.64 0.08 0.05
Regular to specialized (offer gained) 0.65 1.59 0.46 0.48
Regular to specialized (better offer) 0.60 0.92 0.10 0.10
Different regular schools 28.89 30.32 49.89 49.04
Same regular schools (Main Round) 55.64 43.24 48.12 48.98
Same regular schools (Specialized Round) 2.06 2.02 0.16 0.17
School Assignments - status quo vs. Top 7% Plan (% of total)
Always specialized high schools 2.62 6.67 0.42 0.39
Specialized to regular 6.38 14.20 0.56 0.49
Regular to specialized (offer gained) 4.68 4.83 5.28 4.77
Regular to specialized (better offer) 0.72 0.87 0.07 0.10
Different regular schools 28.34 29.90 47.74 46.72
Same regular schools (Main Round) 53.86 42.10 45.61 47.14
Same regular schools (Specialized Round) 0.70 0.50 0.06 0.06
Total Number of Students 9011 9813 21306 26893
Notes: The last row shows the total numbers of public middle school students in four racial categories. For each
column, the corresponding number represents 100%.
In terms of school assignments, there is one category omitted from the table for students who would always go
to La Guardia (a performing art school) or exit the public school system.
Theoretically, those who move from specialized high schools to regular schools can be divided into those who
lose offers and those who choose regular school because they receive worse specialized high school offers. I
do not make the distinction in this table because the second category is very small (0 and 7 students, across all
races, for Chicago and Top 7%, respectively).
Students who move from regular schools to specialized high schools are divided into 1) those who gain spe-
cialized high school offers under the affirmative action plan when they would not have had any offers under the
status quo and 2) those who would get a better offer under the affirmative action plan and thus choose special-
ized high schools even though they would have chosen regular schools before. Students who attend the same
regular school are divided into 1) those who are assigned in the Specialized Round (i.e. they choose regular
schools over specialized high school offers) under both status quo and affirmative action plan and 2) those who
are assigned in the Main Round under both scenarios.
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under the Top 7% plan compared to Chicago plan. As a result, the total inflow of students
from regular schools to specialized high schools is also much larger under Top 7%. There are
two types of inflow: 1) those who gain specialized high school offers under the affirmative
action plan when they would not have had any offers under the status quo and 2) those who
would get a better offer under the affirmative action plan and thus choose specialized high
schools even though they would have chosen regular schools before. Most of the disparity
between the two plans comes from the first type. First, there are substantial differences in
magnitude between the two plans across all the races considered (0.48-1.59% and 4.68-5.28%
for Chicago and Top 7%, respectively). Second, a markedly higher percentage of Asians gain
access compared to other races under the Chicago plan, while the percentages for all four
races are similar under the Top 7% plan. Note that in absolute numbers, there are still many
more Black and Hispanic than White and Asian students who gain access in the Top 7% plan.
Substantial portions of students are also reshuffled among regular school programs under
both plans. Specifically, Black and Hispanic students are more affected both in percent-
age and absolute terms. Surprisingly, even a small exchange between the two sectors in
the Chicago plan causes substantial spillover effects in regular schools. Although it is not
appropriate to compare the outcomes of the two plans here as a way of evaluating their mer-
its against one another,21 the results here show that exchanges of different sizes can cause
similar disturbances in regular school admission, and the identities of the individuals being
exchanged (i.e., both their submitted preferences and priorities at various schools) most likely
play an important role.
21This is due to an assumption on private middle school students. For more details, please refer to Subsection
1.6.1.
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Figure 1.6.1: Racial Composition of specialized high schools under Different Policies
Notes: This figure only takes into account public middle school students for whom racial identities are known,
so 100% for each bar corresponds to the total number of such students who would enroll in specialized high
schools in each scenario. For comparison purpose, I include the last bar that represents the population of all
public middle school students, the main source of high school applicants.
1.6.3 Effects on specialized high schools
The overall diversity and student quality in specialized high schools remain relatively un-
changed under the Chicago plan, whereas there is a substantial increase in the proportions of
Black and Hispanic students and a decrease in overall student quality under the Top 7% plan.
In terms of racial composition, both plans increase the percentages of Black and His-
panic students in specialized high schools but with remarkably different orders of magnitude.
Figure 1.6.1 shows that the changes in the Chicago plan are small enough (all less than 5
percentage points) that the resulting composition still look very similar to that under the sta-
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tus quo. Meanwhile, the changes in the Top 7% plan are all very drastic: the percentage of
Black students increases from 6.27% to 25.70% and that of Hispanic students from 7.18% to
30.21%. While the proportions of White and Asian both decrease, Asian students, who are
most over-represented in specialized high schools under the status quo, experience the most
substantial change that more than halves their percentage. The resulting racial composition
in specialized high schools under the Top 7% plan thus becomes much closer to that of the
public middle school population, the main source of high school applicants, although Blacks
and Hispanics are still under-represented.
The effects on compositions are heterogeneous across individual specialized high schools,
as seen in Table 1.9. Under the Chicago plan, this is mostly due to shuffling within special-
ized high schools in the direction of reducing the dispersion in racial compositions across
specialized high schools. First, although all specialized high schools experience decreases in
percentages of Whites, the greatest changes in terms of percentage points are at the two most
predominantly White schools originally. Second, all but the three schools with the lowest
fractions of Asian originally experience decreases in percentages of Asians. Finally, per-
centages of Black students increase in all schools except for one where Blacks would have
been most well-represented among specialized high schools under the status quo. Under
the Top 7% plan, even though percentages of Black and Hispanic students increase across
the board, the high variance in the magnitude of the increases cause more dissimilarities
among specialized high schools. On one end of the spectrum, Stuyvesant still has a severe
under-representation of Blacks and Hispanics, which only account for 9.98% and 9.70% of
its population, respectively. In contrast, more than 50% of Bronx Science’s and Brooklyn
Latin’s students under the Top 7% plan are Black, which would be an over-representation if
the population of public middle school students is used as a benchmark.
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(b) Top 7% Plan
Figure 1.6.2: Distribution of Grade 8 State Test Scores of Admitted Students to specialized
high schools
Table 1.6: Grade 8 State Test Scores of Admitted Students to Specialized High Schools
status quo Chicago Plan Top 7% Plan
Mean Mean Difference Mean Difference
Stuyvesant 1427.5 1419.1 -8.4*** 1412.2 -15.3***
Bronx Science 1410.8 1407.7 -3.2** 1386.1 -24.8***
Queens Sciences 1405.4 1404.3 -1.1 1392.4 -13.0***
HS of American Studies 1400.5 1404.8 4.3 1377.6 -22.9***
Staten Island Tech 1398.1 1398.9 0.8 1373.0 -25.1***
HS of Maths, Science & Engineering 1404.1 1400.3 -3.8* 1395.0 -9.2***
Brooklyn Tech 1400.7 1403.7 2.9*** 1368.9 -31.8***
Brooklyn Latin 1384.8 1394.3 9.4*** 1362.7 -22.1***
All 1408.3 1406.4 -1.8*** 1384.1 -24.2***
Standard Deviation (specialized high schools Admitted Students under status quo): 29.1
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Student quality, as measured by Grade 8 state test scores, remains almost the same under
the Chicago plan but decreases considerably under the Top 7% plan. Figure 1.6.2 shows
that the distribution of test scores of admitted students under the Chicago plan tracks that
under the status quo quite closely, which is expected given that the overall specialized high
school student population changes very little. In contrast, the distribution clearly shifts left
under the Top 7% plan compared to the status quo. As seen in Table 1.6, the decreases in
mean score of specialized high schools are significant at the 1% level for both plans, but the
magnitude for Chicago plan is negligible whereas the decrease for the Top 7% plan is nearly
one standard deviation of scores for the status quo specialized high school student population.
In terms of school-specific average student quality, some increase and some decrease under
the Chicago plan, leaving the specialized high schools more similar to each other than before,
while average qualities decrease for all specialized high schools under the Top 7% plan.
1.6.4 Effects on Regular High School Programs
Due to considerable reshuffling within regular school programs, both the distributions of
racial compositions and student qualities across these programs change.
The top two histograms in Figure 1.6.3 show that concerning the percentages of White
and Asian students across programs, the three policies (status quo and two affirmative ac-
tion plans) look quite similar. However, concerning the percentages of Black and Hispanic
students, as shown in the bottom histograms, there are noticeable changes compared to the
status quo, especially for the Top 7% plan in which there are more schools with very low
percentages (0-10%) of these two races.
In terms of student quality as measured by mean scores on Grade 8 state test of admitted
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Figure 1.6.3: Distribution of Racial Compositions across Regular High School Programs
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Figure 1.6.4: Mean Grade 8 State Test Scores of Admitted Students - status quo v.s. Affirma-
tive Action Plans
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students, the effects of the two plans are similar: about 52% of regular high school programs
experience increases while the rest experience decreases or no change. Figure 1.6.4 visualizes
this result. When one considers only changes that are statistically significant at the 5% level,
the mean scores increase for about 9% and 10% of the programs under Chicago and Top 7%
plans, respectively, and decrease for about 3% and 4% of the programs.
1.6.5 Heterogeneous Changes in Peer Quality
In the previous two subsections, I have looked at changes in student quality at the school
level. In this subsection, I will consider peer quality at the student level. For each student, the
peer quality is measured by the mean student quality at his or her assigned school, excluding
the student him-or-herself.
Figure 1.6.5 shows the average Grade 8 state test scores of peers for students in the ten
different deciles of scores in the entire population of public middle school students. The
changes in peer quality under both affirmative action plans (compared to the status quo) are
in the same direction for all deciles except for the highest one. In particular, students in the
two lowest deciles experience lower peer quality under the counterfactuals (although their
peers still outperform them on average). Peer quality for students in the third and fourth
deciles remains relatively stable. Meanwhile, peer quality increases for students in the fifth
to ninth deciles. The magnitudes of the increases are similar across plans for the fifth and
ninth deciles, whereas they are higher for the Top 7% plan for the sixth to eighth deciles.
Students in the highest decile, in other words, the best-performing students in the population,
experience an increase in peer quality under the Chicago plan but a decrease under the Top
7% plan.
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Figure 1.6.5: Changes in Peer Quality in High Schools - All students
Notes: Peer quality is measured by average Grade 8 state test scores of peers. Deciles are based on the entire
population of public middle school students. Deciles are based on the entire population of public middle school
students.
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To further investigate the heterogeneity of the effects, I divide students into groups based
on the changes (or lack thereof) in their high school assignments. Figures 1.8.4 and 1.8.5
show the changes in peer quality of these different groups, compared to in the status quo, for
the Chicago and Top 7% plans, respectively. Deciles are still based on the entire population
of public middle school students, so if certain deciles are missing for a particular group, it
means there are no students from said group who belong to those deciles. Although there
may be overlaps, groups with the same label are generally different across affirmative action
plans. For instance, “Always Specialized High Schools” for each plan refers to students who
are assigned to specialized high schools in both the status quo and said plan (regardless of
their assignments in the other plan). Despite this disparity, it is helpful to look at them side-
by-side to highlight the fact that the same type of assignment changes under the two plans
can mean different experiences in terms of peer quality.
As seen in Panel (a) of each figure, students who stay in specialized high schools under
both the status quo and the Chicago plan all belong to one of the top six score deciles in
the broader population. Changes in peer quality are heterogeneous across the students’ own
score deciles: students in the lowest decile (out of the six) experience a sizable increase in
peer quality, those in the next four deciles experience moderate increases, and those in the
highest decile experience a small decrease. This is consistent with the within-specialized-
high-school reshuffling documented in Subsection 1.6.2. Meanwhile, students who stay in
specialized high schools under both the status quo and the Top 7% plan, who are part of the
top four score deciles in the population, all experience considerable decreases in peer quality
due to the drop in overall student quality in specialized high schools under this plan.
Panel (b) shows, for each plan, that across all relevant deciles, students who move from
specialized high schools (under the status quo) to regular schools (under the plan) experi-
49
CHAPTER 1: Predicting the Effect of Affirmative Action Plans in New York City Elite
Public High Schools
SECTION 1.6. THE EFFECTS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLANS
ence considerable decreases in peer quality, which is expected given the marked difference
in student quality between specialized high schools and most regular schools. The effects
are worse for lower-scoring students in the groups. Notably, under Top 7%, those scoring
between 1326 and 1327 points (i.e., in the fifth decile of the large population and lowest
relevant decile for the “Specialized to Regular” group under this plan) go from peers who
perform much better than them on average (at 1385 points) to having peers who perform
worse than them on average (at 1299 points).
Panels (c) and (d) demonstrate that students who move from regular schools to specialized
high schools, whether due to gaining offers or receiving better offers, enjoy higher peer qual-
ity under both plans compared to under the status quo, regardless of their own scores. The
sizes of the gains are generally greater for lower-scoring deciles. In two cases, the increases
in peer quality for the lowest relevant deciles in the groups are so large that the students in
these deciles end up with better-performing peers than those in the next deciles. First, those
gaining offers to specialized high schools under the Chicago plan who are in the fifth score
decile22 would have had worse peers compared to the other deciles under the status quo but
have the best-performing peers under the plan. Second, those gaining better offers under the
Top 7% plan who are in the seventh decile would have had only slightly better peers than
those in the eighth decile under the status quo but now have much better peers that are more
similar to the peers of the two highest deciles.
From Panels (e) and (f), we can see a similar trend under both plans for students who
end up in a different regular schools as well as those who are assigned the same regular
school during the the Main Round. Specifically, those in the lowest deciles are exposed to
lower peer quality under affirmative action compared to the status quo, whereas higher deciles
22The graph shows a lower score decile for this group, but there is only one student in that decile.
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either experience little changes or increases. This pattern agrees with that stated above for
the broader population of all public middle school students under both plans for the first nine
deciles. For the highest decile, it agrees with the overall effect under the Chicago plan. We
have the opposite overall effect for this decile under the Top 7% plan due to the effect for
these groups being canceled out by that for those moving from specialized to regular schools,
who are much more numerous here than under the Chicago plan.
1.6.6 Factors Driving the Results and Policy Implications
Three main factors drive the differences in the outcomes of the two policies: the pools of
students to select from, the “merit” criteria, and the division of students into subgroups.
First, the pool from which students are selected into specialized high schools is much
more restrictive in the Chicago plan, where the students must have taken the SHSAT to be
considered. On the contrary, the Top 7% plan considers all aspiring high school students. In
fact, the 1280 students who are eligible for specialized high schools under this plan but never
took the SHSAT account for 26.9% of the total offers and 48.0% of the policy beneficiaries.
Given that it is not feasible to incentivize disadvantaged students into taking the SHSAT by
explicitly favoring them with bonus scores or similar measures, this result demonstrates that
it is hard to get far in improving specialized high school diversity without abolishing the
SHSAT barrier.23
Second, the two plans currently use two different criteria to define “merit,” with the
Chicago plan using the SHSAT and Top 7% plan using grade 7 state test scores. To in-
vestigate this, I restrict attention to only specialized high school applicants, for whom both
23At the same time, it must be noted that if state tests are used, the current specialized high school applicants will
most likely increase their effort in preparing for the state tests, which may still give them some advantage.
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types of scores are available. Given this population as the selection pool, a policy that selects
the top 7% of each public middle school based on state test scores versus one that selects the
top 7% based on SHSAT scores result in an overlap in specialized high school eligibility that
comprises only 29% of the total number of specialized high schools seats. This is because
the quantile rank to which a student belongs within this population can be quite different de-
pending on the score being used. Figure 1.8.1 plots the quantile rank of all specialized high
school applicants based on SHSAT scores against that based on grade 7 state test scores. Al-
though there is some concentration of students along the 45-degree line, especially for lowest
and highest quantiles, there is also significant dispersion. There exist students who may rank
very high on one test but very low on the other.
Third, the policy outcomes depend on the dispersion of race as well as student quality
across subgroups into which students are assigned. On one hand, a policy is more likely to
increase diversity if the racial compositions are very different across subgroups. On the other,
too much dispersion in student quality across subgroups means that even the best students
selected from lower-performing subgroups are likely to be low-performing compared to the
overall population, thereby reducing the average quality of those admitted to the elite schools.
The first of the two aforementioned points explains why the Top 7% plan is so much more
effective than the Chicago plan at improving overall specialized high school diversity. Figure
1.8.2 illustrates severe racial segregation within New York City public middle schools, which
are the relevant subgroups for Top 7%. In the first two panels, we can see that there is a
large number of schools where there are no White or Asian students. Thus, these schools
contribute greatly to the number of Black and Hispanic students selected for specialized high
school eligibility. In contrast, the differences in racial compositions across neighborhood
tiers, the relevant subgroups for the Chicago plan, are more subdued, as seen in Figure 1.8.3.
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The more similar the compositions within subgroups are to one another, and thus to the
overall composition, the more the selection of top students from each subgroup resembles
the selection of top students from the entire population. As a result, the set of specialized
high school offers in Chicago plan is close to that in the status quo.
Likewise, the more similar the student qualities are across subgroups, the more likely that
the top students within each subgroup are also top students in the population, and their selec-
tion into elite schools would lead to higher student quality in this sector. This is true for the
Chicago plan, where the distributions of student qualities across tiers as measured by Grade 8
state test scores are quite alike, as shown in Panel (a) of Figure 1.6.6. By comparison, a lot of
dispersion is evidenced in the histograms of two middle-school-specific quality measures in
Panel (b) of Figure 1.6.6. The first measure, labeled as the middle-school-specific “cutoff,”
is the lowest Grade 8 state test score among students eligible for specialized high schools
at each middle school;24 and the second measure is the mean Grade 8 state test score of all
students in the school. By plotting them together, one can see that for most schools, except
very high-performing ones, the “cutoff” is lower than the mean at some other schools. This
means some students from the middle school currently being considered receive specialized
high school offers even though they are not as qualified (solely on academic performance) as
an average student at another school, who would not have received offers.
1.7 Conclusions
In this paper, I estimate a model of students’ preferences during the New York City high
school admission process and simulate the effect of two counterfactual affirmative action
24This is not the actual cutoff used during the selection process, which is based on Grade 7 state test scores.
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Figure 1.6.6: Dispersion of Student Qualities (Grade 8 State Test Scores) across Subgroups
Notes: The two panels are not exact counterparts of each other, due to the difference in the numbers of sub-
groups: 4 tiers (Chicago) v.s. 569 public middle schools (Top 7%). Panel (a) shows the full distribution of
student qualities for each tier. Panel (b) shows the histograms of two middle-school-specific statistics: the "cut-
off" for being eligible for specialized high schools and the mean student quality. Here, the "cutoff" at each
school refers the lowest Grade 8 state test score among students eligible for specialized high schools under Top
7% plan; it is not the actual cutoff used during the selection process, which is based on Grade 7 state test scores.
plans on both elite and regular high schools in the city.
There are three key findings from this analysis. First, there is a trade-off between improv-
ing diversity and maintaining student quality in elite schools. A tier-based plan similar to
the one implemented by the Chicago public schools (Chicago plan) barely increases overall
racial diversity but preserves the quality of incoming students. In contrast, a plan that admits
top students in each public middle school based on their academic performance (Top 7%
plan) increases diversity substantially while lowering student quality. Second, the Chicago
plan reduces the differences among schools within the elite sector, whereas the Top 7% plan
increases these differences despite making the elite and regular sectors more similar. Third,
both plans also change regular school assignments and thereby the student quality in regular
high school programs.
The factors driving the results give further insights into how to design affirmative action
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plans in general. Most noticeably, the division of the overall population into subgroups that
are treated separated during the assignment process plays an important role. To increase racial
diversity among those selected, there must be sufficient dispersion in racial compositions
across groups, but to maintain student quality, there should not be too much dispersion in
student quality across groups. I am currently working on fine-tuning a hybrid policy that
aims to achieve the same overall diversity in specialized high schools as the Top 7% plan but
do better than that plan in terms of specialized high school student quality.
Another direction for further research is to consider the medium- and long-term effects
of these affirmative action plans. Unlike the short-run where I assume that preferences over
schools remain unchanged, in the long-run, parents and students will have learned what to
expect of the policy, how it changes school characteristics, and thus their “new” preferences
over schools. It is reasonable to assume that they have rational expectations over these char-
acteristics, and the new equilibrium is found in the simulation by iterating until a fixed point
in the distribution of school characteristics is reached.
Both topics of the hybrid policy and longer-term effects of affirmative action will hopefully
be available in subsequent versions of this paper in the near future.
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1.8 Appendix A: Additional Tables and Figures
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Table 1.8: Estimated Coefficients
Regular high schools programs specialized high schools
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Percent subsidized lunch
× ELA State test score -0.0033*** 9.73E-06 -0.0031 0.0034
×Mathematics State test score -0.0020*** 9.65E-06 -0.0060 0.0052
× Zipcode income 0.0118*** 1.11E-05 0.0046 0.0038
× Eligible for subsidized lunch -0.0070*** 1.78E-05 -0.0008 0.0217
× Asian -0.0169*** 3.95E-05 -0.0101 0.0279
× Black 0.0041*** 3.77E-05 0.0000 0.0287
× Hispanic -0.0100*** 3.90E-05 -0.0546*** 0.0200
× Other -0.0183*** 9.98E-05 0.0040 0.0026
Percent white
× ELA State test score 0.0052*** 1.76E-05 -0.0044 0.0035
×Mathematics State test score 0.0033*** 1.92E-05 -0.0088* 0.0048
× Zipcode income -0.0010*** 2.35E-05 0.0034 0.0033
× Eligible for subsidized lunch -0.0130*** 3.05E-05 0.0048 0.0202
× Asian 0.0117*** 6.84E-05 -0.0294 0.0257
× Black 0.0600*** 7.80E-05 -0.0227 0.0269
× Hispanic 0.0438*** 8.21E-05 -0.0626*** 0.0177
× Other 0.0274*** 2.68E-04 -0.0039** 0.0512
Size of grade 9
× ELA State test score -3.95E-05*** 4.15E-07 0.0001*** 0.0000
×Mathematics State test score -0.0002*** 4.37E-07 0.0004*** 0.0001
× Zipcode income -0.0006*** 5.93E-07 0.0001 0.0000
× Eligible for subsidized lunch -3.75E-05*** 7.16E-07 0.0004* 0.0002
× Asian -0.0007*** 1.35E-06 0.0013*** 0.0003
× Black 0.0001*** 1.59E-06 0.0010*** 0.0003
× Hispanic -0.0001*** 1.38E-06 0.0009*** 0.0002
× Other -0.0002*** 5.35E-06 0.0013 0.0006
Percent high math achievement
× ELA State test score 0.0042*** 1.50E-05 0.0021 0.0018
×Mathematics State test score 0.0130*** 1.96E-05 0.0095*** 0.0030
× Zipcode income 0.0098*** 1.30E-05 0.0032* 0.0017
× Eligible for subsidized lunch 0.0018*** 2.77E-05 0.0005 0.0091
× Asian 0.0340*** 6.37E-05 0.0271*** 0.0101
× Black 0.0275*** 6.64E-05 0.0142 0.0097
× Hispanic 0.0192*** 6.54E-05 0.0020 0.0075
× Other 0.0121*** 1.74E-04 -0.0059 0.0701
Distance (-γ) -1 – -0.0024 0.0072
Scale (λ) 1.5700*** 1.20E-03 – –
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
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Figure 1.8.1: Quantile Rank of Students within specialized high schools Applicants Based on
Grade 7 State Test v.s. SHSAT
Notes: From dark blue to solid yellow, the density of students increases.
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(a) White (b) Asian
(c) Black (d) Hispanic
Figure 1.8.2: Distribution of Racial Compositions across Public Middle Schools
Notes: Each panel is a histogram of the school-specific percentages of one race. The population includes all
public middle schools.
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Figure 1.8.3: Racial Compositions by Neighborhood Tiers
Notes: Tiers are assigned based on median family income of each zip code according to the American Commu-
nity Survey 2007-2011. Tier 1 has income in lowest quantile compared to the rest of New York City; tier 4 has
income in the highest quantile.
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Figure 1.8.4: Changes in Peer Quality in High Schools - Status Quo v.s. Chicago Plan
Notes: Peer quality is measured by average Grade 8 state test scores of peers. Deciles are based on the entire
population of public middle school students. 63
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Figure 1.8.5: Changes in Peer Quality in High Schools - Status Quo v.s. Top 7% Plan
Notes: Peer quality is measured by average Grade 8 state test scores of peers. Deciles are based on the entire
population of public middle school students. 64
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(b) Empirical Cumulative Distribution Function
Figure 1.9.1: Distributions of SHSAT Scores by Tiers
1.9 Appendix B: Different Precedence Orders and
Merit Reserves for the Chicago Plan
I examine four variations of the Chicago plan which combine two different tier-blind prece-
dence orders (merit first and merit last) with two different percentages of merit seats (40%
merit/60% tier and 30% merit/70% tier). My empirical result in the multiple-school setting
of New York City specialized high schools supports the theoretical result in Dur, Pathak and
Sonmez (2016). Since their result is only in terms of offers, not enrollment, I also restrict my
attention to offers in this appendix.
For there to be the best and worst tier-blind precedence orders for different tiers, the score
distributions need to satisfy certain assumptions, which is approximately the case in my cur-
rent setting. Specifically, their Assumption 2 formally requires the “worst-scoring” tier to
have the lowest density among all tiers at every possible score, but the authors also state that
this property of the density function needs only hold for sufficiently high scores to obtain
the result. In my setting, Tier 1 does have the lowest density among all tiers for all SHSAT
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Table 1.10: Percentages of Offers by Tiers for Different Variations of the Chicago Plan
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 4
Merit First - 40% Merit/60% Tier 18.78 25.95 25.18 26.38
Merit First - 30% Merit/70% Tier 20.33 25.62 25.21 25.23
Merit Last - 40% Merit/60% Tier 15.04 25.58 25.82 29.43
Merit Last - 30% Merit/70% Tier 17.54 24.81 24.68 28.95
scores above 420 as seen in Panel (a) of Figure 1.9.1. Similarly, their Assumption 3 regarding
the “best-scoring” tier is not satisfied for every possible score, but the required property does
hold for the range of scores where students may receive offers. The lowest score that allows
admission into at least one of the specialized high schools is 472 under the status quo, where
all offers are based on merit, and Tier 4 does have the highest density for all scores above
this point as seen in Panel (a) of Figure 1.9.1. Although the theoretical result is not based on
first-order stochastic dominance, it is interesting to also note that the empirical score distri-
bution of Tier 4 first-order stochastically dominates those of Tiers 2 and 3, which are very
similar and both dominate the score distribution of Tier 1 as shown in Panel (b) of Figure
1.9.1. This order agrees with the order from the most to the least disadvantaged tiers in terms
of neighborhood income.
Table 1.10 shows the percentages of students receiving offers from specialized high schools
by their tiers. Given the same proportions of merit v.s. tier seats, having merit seats filled
first is the best tier-blind precedence for Tier 1 and the worst for Tier 4, and having merit
seats filled last is the worst tier-blind precedence for Tier 1 and the best for Tier 4, as per the
theoretical prediction. To see this, we need to compare the first and third rows, which both
have 40% merit seats but different precedence, and compare the second and last rows. In
both cases, higher percentages of admitted students belong to Tier 1 and lower percentages
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belong to Tier 4 when merit seats are filled first. Note that when merit seats are filled last,
for both variations considered here, the percentages of admitted students that belong to Tier
1 are almost exactly the same as the percentages set aside for Tier 1 seats (15% and 17.5%
respectively), that is, almost no Tier 1 students get in through merit seats.
Given the same precedence order, when the proportion of merit seats is reduced, Tier 1
students, who have systematically lower scores and hence less likely to get in through merit
seats, gain more access whereas some Tier 4 students lose access. Note that by decreasing the
percentage of merit seats from 40% to 30% (concurrently increasing the percentage of Tier
1 seats from 15% to 17.5%), the percentages of Tier 1 students among those admitted only
increase by around 1.5 to 2.5 percentage points depending on the precedence. Meanwhile,
changing the precedence order form merit last to merit first has larger effects, resulting in
increases of 2.7 to 3.7 percentage points depending on the proportion of merit seats. A
similar comparison of the effects of change in the proportion of merit seats v.s. change in
precedence order can be made for Tier 4 students.
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2.1 Introduction
Gale and Shapley (1962)’s student-proposing Deferred Acceptance mechanism has become
increasingly ubiquitous in school choice to assign students to schools. This is, in part, thanks
to its strategyproofness, an attractive property, which, informally in this context, means that
it is in the students’ best interest to report their true preferences. However, a growing body of
experimental literature has recorded large deviations from truth-telling when subjects partic-
ipate in the Deferred Acceptance mechanism in laboratory settings. At the same time, there
has also been empirical evidence that some of these “mistakes” have little to no effects on
payoff (Artemov, Che and He, 2020).
This paper introduces learning into a lab experiment of centralized matching mechanisms,
Deferred Acceptance in particular. Our contribution is two-fold. First, we shed light on
the nature of “mistakes” that occur in the lab. We find that the majority of these mistakes are
payoff-irrelevant as in Artemov, Che and He (2020). We show that payoff-irrelevant mistakes
are more common when subjects have had the opportunities to learn to coordinate within the
same environment, and they occur despite evidence that subjects have gained an understand-
ing of the strategyproofness of the mechanism. Second, our results provide insights into the
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learning process of students who receive feedback in centralized matching.
In our laboratory experiment, we adopt a 2x2 design, with two matching mechanisms
(between-subjects) and two treatments (within-subjects). The two mechanisms are Gale-
Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) and Boston Immediate Acceptance (IA) algorithms.
While DA is our focus, IA serves as a control. In each experimental session, we use only
one of the mechanisms. At the beginning of the session, the rules of the relevant mechanism
are clearly explained, accompanied by an example. Each session is divided into two parts for
the two different treatments. Part one involves a random environment without school zones,
and part two, a designed environment with school zones (where students are informed of
their higher chance of being admitted in two out of five schools). Within each part, there are
8 rounds, each consisting of 5 periods. In every period, each participant plays the role of a
student who applies to multiple schools. There are 20 students and 5 schools. Participants
are informed of their own payoffs for being admitted into the schools and asked for an or-
der in which they would apply to those schools. Within a round, the environment (schools’
priorities and students’ preferences) is unchanged, and periods differ only in the rankings
submitted by participants. Across the rounds, the environment changes, but the mechanism
does not.
Focusing on DA, we observe two opposite patterns in truthfulness within a round and
across rounds. Across periods within the same round, when the environment remains con-
stant, truthful reporting decreases over time. However, payoffs do not change much through-
out the round, and the vast majority of participants obtain the same payoff as if they were
fully truthful. In contrast, truthful reporting increases over time across rounds when the en-
vironment changes but the same matching mechanism is used. We do not observe the same
trend for IA, for which truth-telling is not necessarily a good strategy.
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Given the patterns above, we argue that participants learn about the strategyproofness of
the DA mechanism throughout the experimental session. This is supported both by a further
comparison with the results in the IA sessions and by an examination of the first period of
every round when a new environment is generated. Within each round, when subjects are
allowed to learn to coordinate within the same environment, the best possible match each of
them can get is often easy to predict in later periods. Subsequently, their untruthfulness is
mostly payoff-irrelevant and relates to the concepts of robust equilibrium and stable-response
strategy introduced by Artemov, Che and He (2020). We also find that a higher payoff leads
to a subject being more likely to keep the same strategy in the next period, consistent with
reinforcement learning.
This paper contributes to the experimental literature on matching markets, particularly
school choice, by exploring the learning process of students who receive feedback in inter-
active environments. Hakimov and Kubler (2019) offer a systematic review of the relevant
literature. Starting from the earliest lab experiments on school choice (Chen and Sonmez,
2006; Pais and Pinter, 2008; Calsamiglia, Haeringer and Klijn, 2010, 2011), the designs put
significant emphasis on the comparison of different mechanisms (DA, IA, and TTC), from
the perspective of efficiency and stability. The main results on strategyproofness of the mech-
anisms are systematically aligned with the theoretical predictions, with the lowest proportion
of truthful reporting under IA, but efficiency results are mixed. Surprisingly, there is unequiv-
ocal evidence of departure from the complete truth-telling, with fractions of truthful reporting
under DA ranging between 40% and 80% (on average, larger fractions were registered when
the design included fewer schools to rank). Other common results include systematic biases
in favor of schools with many seats and schools that belong to the same “zone” as the student
(in both cases, perceived with a higher probability of admission). More recent experiments
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compared traditional and modified mechanisms, such as the parallel mechanism (Chen and
Kesten, 2019) and the secure Boston mechanism (Dur, Hammond and Morrill, 2019).
A small number of experimental papers on school choice provide more detailed results on
the learning process in this domain, either by testing it directly or by adopting designs in
which participants play multiple rounds of matching with the same mechanism. In the vast
majority of the studies, we observe a positive trend of reported truthful over time under DA
(up to a 30% increase), but with a ceiling around 80% regardless of the characteristics of the
environment. Furthermore, the starting level and slope of truthfulness trends over time are
negatively correlated with the number of schools in the task, with slower increases (or even
decreases) being observed when the environment contains more than four schools (Chen and
Kesten, 2019; Bo and Hakimov, 2020).
In contrast with all the previously listed experiments, we focus more explicitly on learning
in an interactive environment. As in the previous cases, we let the participants play under the
same mechanism for several rounds, allowing them to reach a clearer understanding of how
the algorithm operates. In addition, we have an explicit form of feedback, that is represented
by the realized match given the (unobservable) schools’ priorities, and the combination of
own and others’ application lists. Each participant submits a list for multiple periods within
each environment (experimental round), with the possibility to revise the list at the beginning
of each period. This procedure allows the participant to learn about the elements of the
environment that are not directly observable. At the same time, the comparison of the effect
of own change across periods is confounded by the presence of other human participants,
who also can revise their own lists.
Ding and Schotter (2019) also consider learning in an interactive environment, and they
address similar research questions, but with a different paradigm. In their experiments, par-
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ticipants repeatedly played DA or IA in a market comprised of five students and three schools
(one seat each). Participants were informed about their own preferences and schools’ pri-
orities, and groups were randomly re-matched in every round. They observe a significant
increase in truthful reporting under DA (from 64% to 77% over 20 rounds) and no increase
in IA. Our design differs in many aspects, such as the size of the environment (20 students
and 5 schools), the fact that all students can be successfully assigned to a school, the lack of
explicit information about school priority, and the absence of re-matching across rounds.
A different group of experimental papers focus on learning in the form of advice, either
from a previous participant to the experiment (Ding and Schotter, 2017) or from a third party
(Guillen and Hing, 2014). Most of the studies conclude that providing correct advice in-
creases the rates of truthful reporting in strategyproof mechanisms, but the opposite effect is
even stronger when wrong advice is provided, with a large number of participants manipulat-
ing their preference reports.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design.
Section 3 presents our analysis of the results, and section 4 concludes.
2.2 Experimental Design
We design our experiment to compare the learning behavior under different assignment mech-
anisms. We implement a two-by-two design: for each of the two mechanisms, Deferred Ac-
ceptance (DA) and Immediate Acceptance (IA), we examine a random environment (without
school zones) and a designed environment (with school zones). The first manipulation occurs
between subjects, with each participant being assigned to one mechanism only. The second
manipulation occurs within subjects, with the random environment being presented first, fol-
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(a) Beginning of period 1 (b) Beginning of period 4 (same round)
Figure 2.2.1: Experimental interface (Part 1)
Notes: The experimental interface contains the list of the schools, each with an associated monetary value, and
an empty application list that the participant can fill freely by clicking on the schools’ names. The screen also
contains a shrinking timer that indicates the time available to complete the choice, and two buttons, to submit
the application in advance or restart the application list.
lowed by the designed environment. Despite the possible concern for the order effect, we
prioritize clarity of the task for the participants and frame the second environment as a vari-
ation on the first part. Each environment condition is used for eight subsequent rounds, with
each round comprised of five periods. In each period, twenty students compete for twenty
seats (five schools, four seats each). We now describe the details of the experimental design,
which apply to all the conditions unless otherwise specified.
Students’ Preferences and Schools’ Priorities. Each student receives a random ranking
of the schools, with values ranging from $1 to $9, with $2 increments. Subjects are informed
that different participants may have different payoff values, and receive detailed information
about how the values are generated, with particular emphasis on the fact that the ranking is
not independent across students, and on average participants like the schools located at the
top of the list more than the schools at the bottom. The ranking of each student is generated
by summing, for each school, a common score and a random score. The common score (0
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to 12 points, equally spaced) is the same for all students and determined by the rank used to
display the schools on the screen. The random score (0 to 8 points) is independent across
students and across schools, which allows students to have different preferences. The sum of
the two scores determines the subjective ranking of the schools, and this ranking is associated
with the monetary amounts displayed as values for the seat. Participants can observe their
own preferences, but not other students’ preferences. They also know that all preferences stay
constant within each round but change across rounds. In the designed environment condition,
students’ zones and schools’ zones have no effect on the ranking.
Schools’ priorities are generated differently in the random environment (without school
zones) and in a designed environment (with school zones). In both environments, students
are not directly informed about schools’ priorities, but they are aware that priorities astay
constant within each round but change across rounds. In the random environment, each
school independently generates a random ranking of the twenty students. In the designed
environment, each student receives a color (orange or blue, indicating her own zone, ten
students for each color), and the five schools are partitioned into two schools for each color,
plus a white (neutral) school. Colors are randomly assigned at the beginning of each round
and remain unchanged within the round. For each school, the probability of a student being
among the top 4 positions of the priority list depends on her color. If the student’s color
matches [does not match] the school, she has a 30% probability [10% probability] of being
among the top four positions.1
School Application Task. Each period is comprised of an application phase and a subse-
quent assignment phase. During the application phase, each student submits an application
1A separate random draw determines which students are among the top 4 positions. The relative ranking
of those four students is random. Similarly, the relative ranking of the students ranked 5th and below is
randomly generated.
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(a) Beginning of period 1 (b) Beginning of period 4 (same round)
Figure 2.2.2: Experimental interface (Part 2)
Notes: The experimental interface differs from the previous one only because of the “student’s color" (top right
of the screen) and the colors associated with the various schools.
list, which indicates in which order they want to apply to schools. Students are not forced
to apply to all five schools, although not doing so means that they may end up unassigned
(an outcome with value $0, strictly lower than a seat in any school). The application phase
has a limited time (60 seconds in period 1, 30 seconds in all the subsequent periods), but
participants can submit their own application lists before the timeout.
In the assignment phase, each participant observes to which school she would be assigned,
given other students’ current application lists as well as her own. The assignment is salient,
and it is displayed both with the school’s name in the application list and its value below
the application list (see Figures 2.2.1 and 2.2.2). No other information (schools’ priorities or
other students’ assignments) is communicated to the participants. The application phase has
a fixed time of 10 seconds, after which all the participants move to the next period.
Each round is comprised of five periods, and within a round, there is no change in students’
preferences, schools’ priorities, nor zones (in the designed environment condition). From
period 2 to 5, participants can revise the application list, and submit either the previous one
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or a new one, with no direct cost or benefit from the revision. The task is repeated for eight
different rounds for each environment (random and designed).
Procedure. The experiment was run in CELSS (Columbia Experimental Laboratory for
Social Sciences, Columbia University, New York, USA) between March and April 2019. The
experiment was coded in MATLAB (Release 2018b) using Psychotoolbox 3 (Psychophysics
Toolbox Version 3). Seventy-six volunteers (38 in the Boston treatment, and 38 in the Gale-
Shapley treatment) were recruited from the students registered in the Marked Design under-
graduate course at Columbia University as optional assignment for the class’ requirements.2
On average, the whole experiment took 60 minutes, including instructions. Participants did
not receive any monetary incentive for their participation in the study, but they were moti-
vated by the fact that their scores in the task would be posted on the website of the course.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that participants were motivated to get a high score and put
effort into the task as if they were facing a monetary incentive.
We ran four sessions in total (two sessions for each mechanism). Each session is designed
for a group of twenty subjects, and the actual number of participants ranged between eighteen
and twenty. When the number was not exactly twenty, the missing participants were replaced
by automatic computer programs. Human participants were informed that each program was
submitting a list of schools in the first period of each round, but not revising it in the following
periods. Instructions were read aloud by the experimenter, and were also provided to each
participant as paper printout (see Appendix 2.6). There are two versions of the instructions
(one for each matching mechanism), containing the same information verbatim with the ex-
ception of the tailored information on the mechanism being used. The instructions included
2Crucially, the experiment was run before the instructor discussed the mechanisms for school assignment in
class.
76
CHAPTER 2: Matching and Learning – An Experimental Study
SECTION 2.3. RESULTS
detailed information about the task, the data generating process used to generate priorities and
payoffs, as well as the matching mechanism (described formally first, and illustrated with an
example after). In addition to the written instructions, the main projectors of the laboratory
were used to illustrate the matching mechanism in the example and to display screenshots of
the experimental interface. Clarifying questions, if any, were answered publicly.
2.3 Results
We focus our analysis on the results of the Deferred Acceptance (DA) sessions, and contrast
it with Immediate Acceptance (IA) when appropriate. We also restrict our attention to the
first part of the experiment to avoid the potentially confounding effect of time and school
zones in part 2.
2.3.1 Across Periods within A Round
We find that for all ex-ante measures of (un)truthfulness, that is, measures that are indepen-
dent of the resulting match, truthful reporting decreases over time within a round. However,
payoffs remain relatively stable throughout the round because the majority of untruthful par-
ticipants behave in such a way that they still obtain the same payoff as under truthful report-
ing.
Figure 2.3.1 includes the plots for two ex-ante (un)truthfulness measures for the five peri-
ods, averaged over rounds. Both show that truthful reporting decreases further into the round.
As seen in Panel (a), the fraction of participants who are fully truthful (i.e., reporting their
exact true preferences) drops sharply from the first to the second period before mostly lev-
eling out. Panel (b) shows are similar story when we move from the aforementioned binary
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(a) Fraction of fully truthful participants (b) Kemeny distance from submitted ranking to
true preference
Figure 2.3.1: Across periods - Measures of ex-ante (un)truthfulness
measure to one that also takes into account the intensity of truthful reporting for each partic-
ipant. The Kemeny distance from the submitted list to the true preference is the number of
pairwise comparisons in the submitted list that deviate from the true preference: the higher
this measure is, the less truthful the participants are. It increases considerably from close to
0 in the first period to more than 2 in period 2 and then remains between 2 and 2.5 until the
end of the round. With five schools, there are a total of ten pairwise comparisons, so during
periods 2 to 5, an average participant is untruthful for 20-25% of the pairwise rankings.
Figure 2.3.2 plots two different measures of payoff for the five periods, averaged over
rounds. Panel (a) demonstrates that average payoffs remain relatively stable across the five
periods. Meanwhile, Panel (b) shows the payoff loss for each participant compared to what
they would have gotten by best-replying to the actual strategy profile of their opponents. For
DA, as is the case here, full truthfulness is a best-reply to any strategy profile of the oppo-
nents, so this measure can also be considered as payoff loss compared to truthful reporting.
There is a slight increase in payoff loss at the beginning of the round before it levels out.
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(a) Average Payoff (b) Payoff loss (compared to best reply)
Figure 2.3.2: Across periods - Measures of Payoff
The magnitude of both the average payoff loss (ranging from 0.15 to 0.3) and the increase
in payoff loss are small compared to the average payoff (5.3-5.4). This suggests that each
participant was very close to best-replying to their opponents’ strategies even though they
might not be using the dominant strategy (truth-telling).
To further investigate this phenomenon, we divide the participants into three categories
within each period: truthful, untruthful with no effect on payoff (i.e. the payoff loss outlined
above is zero), and untruthful with effect (i,e, the payoff loss is positive). We find that the
vast majority of the 38 participants (between 90-94%) belong to the first two groups for all
periods, which explains why although the fraction of full truthfulness decreases, this has
little effect on payoff. In line with the pattern in truthful reporting, the most drastic change
in composition of participants occur in the second period, where 49% of those who were
truthful in the first period switch to untruthful with no effect on payoff (see the transition
matrix on the left in Figure 2.3.3). While there exist movements between groups for all the
later periods, the composition always stay close to that attained in period 2. As seen in the
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Figure 2.3.3: Transition matrices: periods 1 to 2 (left) and periods 4 to 5 (right).
transition matrix on the right in Figure 2.3.3, by the time we reach the transition from period
4 to period 5, a large fraction (75%) of those in the truthful and untruthful unaffected groups
stay within the same group. The proportion of participants in the untruthful affected group
rises from 5% in period 1 to 8-9% in later periods, which accounts for the slight increase in
payoff loss documented above.
2.3.2 Across Rounds
When we make the comparison across rounds, truthful reporting increases over time during
the session for DA. The same trend is not observed for IA (the control), suggesting that
(some) participants eventually learn that DA is a strategy-proof mechanism while IA is not.
While the fractions of truthful participants start out at comparable levels for the first round
of both mechanisms, they diverge in later rounds. Panel (a) of Figure 2.3.4 shows an upward
trend in the fraction of full truthfulness under the DA mechanism, from about 34% in the first
round to 51% in the eighth round (within the range of the previous literature). In contrast,
the equivalent fraction under the IA mechanism fluctuates between 25 and 40% throughout
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Table 2.1: Truthfulness and Payoff - DA vs. IA




Truthfulness Untruthful Unaffected (vs best reply)
Constant 0.542*** 0.905*** 5.291*** 0.284***
(0.029) (0.016) (0.163) (0.048)
IA Dummy -0.057 0.089 1.712***
(0.042) (0.236) (0.138)
Round 0.019*** 0.007** -0.003 -0.023**
(0.006) (0.003) (0.031) (0.011)
Period -0.047*** -0.005 0.024 0.029
(0.009) (0.005) (0.050) (0.019)
IA * Round -0.013* 0.055 0.010
(0.008) (0.044) (0.027)
IA * Period 0.004 -0.040 -0.134***
(0.013) (0.072) (0.043)
R-squared 0.029 0.004 0.0023 0.1562
N 2960 1480 2960 2960
Notes: Observations are at the session-round-period-participant level. For columns (1), (3), and (4), the sample
includes observations from part I (rounds 1-8) of all four experimental sessions. For columns (2), the sample is
restricted to the two DA sessions.
The round and period numbers are normalized to 0-7 and 0-4, respectively, so that the constant indicates the
average level of truthfulness in the first period of the first round under DA.
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(a) DA vs. IA - All periods (b) DA only - Periods 1 and 5
Figure 2.3.4: Across rounds - Fraction of truthful participants
the session. The same pattern can be seen in the first column of Table 2.1, which presents
the results for the regression of an indicator for full truthfulness on a dummy for the IA
mechanism, round number (1 to 8), period number (1 to 5), and their interactions. In the
first period of the first round, there is no significant difference in the level of truthfulness
between the two mechanisms. As the experiment progresses, the probability of truthfulness
improves by 1.9 percentage point per round on average (significant at the 1% level) under DA
as opposed to the 1.3 percentage point decrease (significant at the 10% level) under IA.
Under DA, there is no significant change in payoff, but payoff loss decreases marginally
across rounds (according to columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.1). The decrease in payoff loss
is attributable to the modest increase in the fraction of participants who are either truthful or
untruthful but unaffected in terms of payoffs. Although both of the aforementioned changes
are significant (at the 5% level), the magnitudes are negligible.
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2.3.3 Explaining the Results
2.3.3.1 Learning about the Mechanism and Payoff-Irrelevant Mistakes
Although participants learn about the optimality of truth-telling under the DA mechanism,
when they are allowed to learn to coordinate within the same environment, a large fraction
deviate from full truthfulness in a way that is payoff-irrelevant. Two main arguments support
the existence of learning about the mechanism over time: when we compare DA to the control
IA and when we concentrate our attention on periods in which participants were faced with
a new environment. We find that subjects were presumably able to predict their best possible
match in later periods within each round, and their untruthfulness relates to the concepts of
robust equilibrium and stable-response strategy introduced by Artemov, Che and He (2020).
The comparison between DA and IA points to not only the fact that subjects had some
understanding of the strategyproofness of DA but also that at least some of them acquired this
over time during the experimental session. As we described in the previous subsection, there
is a significant increase in truthful reporting across rounds under DA that is not replicated
under IA. Given the random assignment of subjects into the two mechanisms, it is likely
that this result is driven by subjects’ understanding of the mechanism’s underlying property.
In theory, this understanding can be obtained immediately after reading the description and
example of the mechanism in the instructions. However, we can attribute it to learning during
actual participation (with feedback) in the mechanism for at least some participants because
there is no significant difference in truthfulness between IA and DA in the first round (and
the first period of that round, in particular).
Now, let us focus on the first period of each round, when participants had not yet learned
to coordinate with each other in the new environment. Panel (a) of Figure 2.3.4 demonstrates
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(a) Across Periods - Absolute changes in payoff (b) Across Periods - Relative partial truthfulness
Figure 2.3.5: Payoff Predictability and Observed Strategy
Notes: Relative partial truthfulness is defined as reporting the truthful relative rankings among schools above or
equal to the realized match.
that the increase in truth-telling across rounds, previously reported for the average over all
periods, persists under this restriction. Moreover, we can see that although truthfulness is
lower in period 5 than period 1 of every round, this low level in the last period of a round
does not carry over the period immediately after it (i.e. period 1 of the next round) when the
environment is new. This further confirms that the decrease in truthful reporting we observe
across periods within a round can be ascribed to learning to coordinate and does not discount
the learning-about-the-mechanism hypothesis. We also confirm that participants who became
consistently truthful in the first periods towards the end of the experimental session account
for a considerable part of the increase in truthful reporting across rounds. Figure 2.5.1 shows
the fractions of participants (compared to the total) who were truthful in the first period for all
8 rounds, all of the last 7 rounds, all of the last 6 rounds, and so on. Half of of the participants
who were truthful in the last round (76% of the total) had been truthful for the last 5 rounds
(inclusive of round 8).
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The observed pattern in the data provides suggestive evidence of the ease of predicting the
best possible match during later periods of each round. We remarked in subsection 2.3.1 that
average payoffs remain stable across periods, but this could be masking large positive and
negative changes occurring at the same time for different participants. Panel (a) of Figure
2.3.5 shows that this is not the case: the absolute changes in payoff, ranging on average be-
tween 0.3 and 0.5 through out the round, are small compared to the increment of $2 between
consecutive prizes and the difference of $1 between the unmatched outcome and the lowest
prize. Note that there is a one-to-one correspondence between payoffs and schools. There-
fore, given little change in payoffs and 90-94% of participants receiving as-if-truth-telling
payoffs, participants could assume (often correctly) that the best match they could obtain was
the same as their previous match.
To examine the subjects’ ranking strategies, we define an “ex-post” notion of truthfulness
that relies on knowledge of the match. From a participant’s point of view when choosing
their strategy, it is their best guess of the match, which is unobservable to the experimenter.
Hence, we use the realized match, which as argued above was easy to predict. Relative partial
truthfulness is, then, a binary measure indicating that a subject reported the truthful relative
rankings among schools of higher or equal positions to the match in the submitted list. In
other words, all schools ranked above the match are in the correct order and preferred to
the match. Panel (b) of Figure 2.3.5 shows that the majority of paticipants (between 76 and
84%, depending on the period) satisfy relative partial truthfulness with respect to the realized
match. In period 1, the large fraction of relative partial truthfulness is mostly driven by fully
truthful participants (68 out of the 80 percentage points). Since this measure uses realized
instead of predicted match, the decrease in periods 2 and 3 can be plausibly explained by the
fact that it may take time to notice a pattern and accurately predict the best possible match,
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after which it rises in periods 4 and 5. Notably, even though full truthness is low in these last
two periods (37-38%), relative partial truthfulness is even higher than that in period 1.
The untruthful behavior of the participants in our experiment relates to the theory in Arte-
mov, Che and He (2020). First, they formalize the robust equilibrium concept, which allows
for mistakes along as they become payoff irrelevant when the market grows arbitrarily large
and the set of feasible schools for each participant becomes close to deterministic. Even
though the market is small in our experiment, we show above that empirically the most pre-
ferred feasible school is stable and easy to predict in the later periods of each round. Second,
the relatively partially truthful strategies employed by the majority of our participants belong
to a subset of Artemov, Che and He (2020)’s stable-response strategy, which requires the
most preferred feasible school to be ranked above all other feasible schools in the limit con-
tinuum economy. Note that while a stable response strategy allows for a worse but infeasible
school to be above the most preferred feasible school, relative partial truthfulness rules out
this behavior. It is understandable that this is the case in a small economy, where there is
more uncertainty regarding the set of feasible schools.
2.3.3.2 Reinforcement Learning within a Round
We examine subjects’ tendency to revise their strategies when going from one period to an-
other and find that the higher the payoff the more likely a subject would keep the same
strategy in the next period, which is consistent with reinforcement learning.
Table 2.2 presents logistic regressions of the probability of no revision in four different
specifications, considering the previous period (specifications 1 and 2) and the previous two
periods (specifications 3 and 4). In all specifications, the coefficient on lagged payoff is
positive and significant at the 1% level although the magnitude are smaller in specifications 3
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Table 2.2: Logistic Regression - Probability of No Revision
Pr(No revision in period t)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -3.848*** -4.938*** -1.602*** -3.438***
(0.354) (0.780) (0.475) (1.007)
Full Truthfulness (t−1) 2.049*** 1.631*** 1.767*** 1.706***
(0.299) (0.320) (0.385) (0.428)
Relative Partial Truthfulness Only (t−1) 0.764** 0.644* 0.925*** 0.834**
(0.311) (0.335) (0.354) (0.392)
Payoff (t−1) 0.365*** 0.481*** 0.210*** 0.351***
(0.033) (0.044) (0.046) (0.059)∆Payoff (t−2 to t−1) 0.314* 0.301
(0.161) (0.193)
Revision (t−1) -2.326*** -1.891***
(0.226) (0.243)∆Payoff *Revision (t−1) -0.080 -0.084
(0.172) (0.206)
Round FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Participant FEs No Yes No Yes
Periods 2-5 2-5 3-5 3-5
Pseudo R-squared 0.265 0.390 0.410 0.476
N 1184 1184 888 888
Notes: “Relative partial truthfulness only” refers to strategies that satisfy relative partial trutfulness without
being fully truthful.
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and 4 when we look at a sample of period 3 onwards and control for revision in the previous
period (or lack thereof) and the associated payoff change. In other words, the probability
of keeping the current strategy is increasing in the payoff said strategy brings, consistent
with reinforcement learning. This result is not driven by individual’s intrinsic propensity
to revise. In fact, the estimated impact of payoff grows when we include participant fixed
effects (specification 2 as opposed to 1 and 4 as opposed to 3). The change in payoff also has
a positive effect on not revising, but it becomes insignificant once participant fixed effects are
controlled for. Note that having adopt a relatively partially truthful strategy (whether or not
it is fully truthful) in the previous period is also less likely to lead to revision.
2.4 Conclusion
We use a lab experiment to study learning when participants receive feedbacks in centralized
matching mechanisms widely used in school choice and other real-world applications. Our
results provide a deeper understanding of participants’ “mistakes” in strategyproof mecha-
nisms like Deferred Acceptance as well as their learning process.
A novel aspect of our experimental design is to include the distinction between rounds
and periods, allowing for two types of learning. Within a round, the environment (schools’
priorities and students’ preferences) is unchanged, and periods differ only in the rankings
submitted by participants. Thus, agents learn to coordinate, which in our experiment induces
them to become untruthful in a way that is payoff irrelevant. Across the rounds, the environ-
ment changes, but the mechanism does not. There is suggestive evidence that agents do have
a better grasp of the underlying property of the mechanism through this experience.
We plan to run more experimental sessions with an improved design, which includes ran-
88
CHAPTER 2: Matching and Learning – An Experimental Study
SECTION 2.4. CONCLUSION
domizing the order of the environments with and without school zones and allowing for more
periods within a round. Another direction of future research would be to explore sequen-
tial admission procedures, as seen in German university admission, where the feedback and
learning process (although very different from our current experiment) can be implemented
in a real-world setting.
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2.5 Appdendix A: Additional Figure
Figure 2.5.1: Fraction of participants who have been truthful in the first period of the last x
round(s)
2.6 Appendix B: Instructions for the Experiment
2.6.1 Instructions for the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism
(Mechanism G)
Thank you for participating in this experiment on decision making. From now until the end
of the session any communication with other participants is forbidden. Foods and drinks are
not allowed in the lab, and we ask you to turn off your mobile phone.
If you have any question, feel free to ask at any point of the experiment. Please do so
by raising your hand and one of us will come to your desk and answer your question privately.
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This session will last approximately 90 minutes and comprise of multiple rounds. Through-
out the experiment the following rules apply.
You and every other participant play the role of a student who is applying to several schools
sequentially. Different schools have different values for you (i.e. how much you like them),
and you will choose in which order to apply to the schools. Your goal is to be accepted by a
school with a high value. Application is done by submitting an application list of schools.
Each school has a priority list over students (i.e., a ranking of students) ,which determines
in which order applicants are considered for acceptance.
Schools have different priorities over students; students have similar but not identical
preferences over schools.
The computer will run a matching algorithm that utilizes the application lists submitted
by the students and the schools’ priority lists over students. This algorithm will determine
who is assigned to which school.
The experiment involves N human participants and 20-N automated computer program(s),
which will make decisions under the same conditions as yours.
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Submitted application list
Each student (including the computer programs) submits an application list, which indicates
in which order she wants to apply to schools. That is:
• The first school in the list is the first school to which the student will apply.
• The second school in the list is the the next school to which the student will apply if
rejected by the first school.
• and so on. . .
Priority list over students
Each school has a priority list that will not be communicated to you. Schools decide
to accept or reject students who applied to them using their own priority list. There are 5
schools with 4 seats at each school.
The priority list of each school is generated independently.
Student’s payoff if accepted to a school
Your payoff depends on the value of the school where you are accepted. You will see on
the screen a table outlining the value for each school.
Different participants may have different payoff tables.
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Matching Algorithm G
The participants are assigned to schools by a multi-step algorithm.
Step 1:
• Each student applies to the school that is ranked first in her submitted application list.
• Each school tentatively accepts the applicants who have applied to it, one at a time,
using the school’s priority list and starting with the applicant with the highest priority.
It does so until it has admitted as many students as its capacity or runs out of applicants.
The remaining applicants (if any) are rejected by the school.
Step 2, 3, ...: This step is only for the students who have been rejected in the previous step.
• Each of those students apply to the next school on their submitted application list. If
a student has already applied to all the schools in her application list, then that student
remains unassigned (and the algorithm ends for that student).
• Each school considers the set of students it accepted at the previous step together with
the set of new applicants. From this larger set, the school tentatively accepts students,
one at a time, using the school’s priority list and starting with the applicant with the
highest priority. It does so until it has admitted as many students as its capacity or runs
out of applicants. The remaining applicants (if any) are rejected by the school.
End: The algorithm stops when either no school receives any new applications, or no appli-
cation is rejected.
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Example (Mechanism G)
This is a small example that shows how the algorithm works. We consider
• 3 students: A, B and C
• 3 schools: 1, 2, and 3. Each school has 1 seat.
Schools’ priority lists of students are described in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Schools’ priority lists of students
Priority School 1 School 2 School 3
1st A A C
2nd C B B
3rd B C A
So, for instance, at school 3, student C is considered first, then B, then A.
The application lists submitted by the students are in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4: Students’ submitted application lists
Student A Student B Student C
1st application 1 1 2
2nd application 2 2 3
3rd application 3 3 1
So, for instance, student C will first apply to school 2. Then, if rejected, she will apply to
school 3. Finally, if rejected again, she will apply to school 1. The other students’ application
lists are read similarly.
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Let’s run the algorithm.
Step 1 Students A and B apply to school 1, and C applies to school 2.
• School 1 starts accepting the students who applied to it following the order given by its
priority. A is the top priority student, so she is accepted. School 1 cannot accept any
more student (it reached its capacity of 1), so B is rejected.
• The other student, C, applies to school 2. She is the only applicant, so she is accepted.
At the end of the first step, A is tentatively accepted at school 1, C is tentatively accepted at
school 2, and B is not accepted at any school.
Step 2 Student B applies to school 2.
• School 2 has now two applicants: C (from Step 1) and B. B has higher priority than C,
and since school 2 has only one seat available, B is now tentatively accepted at school
2 and C is rejected.
At the end of the second step, A is tentatively accepted at school 1, B is tentatively accepted
at school 2, and C is not accepted at any school.
Step 3 Student C applies to school 3.
• She is the only applicant, so she is accepted.
No student is rejected, so the algorithm stops.
The final assignment is
Student A Student B Student C
School 1 School 2 School 3
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Part I
You can see on the main screen how the interface of the experiment looks like. The first half
of the session consists of 8 Rounds, each divided into 5 Periods. We are in the first part of
the session, first round, first period.
On the right-hand side, you can see the five schools (each with a different letter) and your
value in case you are accepted there. Each school has 4 seats. If you are not accepted to any
school, your payoff will be $0.
You create your application list by clicking on the school boxes on the right. After each
click, the school is crossed out and it is added to your application list on the left, in the highest
empty box still available. Keep clicking on the schools until you are ready to submit. Click
the submit button to confirm your application list, or click on the clear button to reset the list
and start from scratch. You can submit your list without applying to all 5 schools.
You have a limited amount of time to submit your application list. The available time is
indicated by a timer below the school values. If you run out of time before clicking submit,
the current application list on your screen is submitted automatically.
After a few seconds, a new period starts with the same school values for all students and
same priority lists for all schools as in the previous period. You can observe the school
you were accepted to in the previous period (highlighted in the red square) and the payoff
associated with it (written below the application list). Now you can review your application
list and submit the same or a different one. The experiment proceeds in this way for five
periods.
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After the end of the fifth period, a new round starts with different school priorities and
different student payoffs. Remember that your objective is to get as many dollars as possible
in each period.
The schools’ priority lists and students’ payoffs are generated as follows.
Priority list over students
Each school independently generates a random ranking of the 20 students.
Students’ payoffs
Each student receives a random ranking of the schools, with values ranging from $1 to $9
with $2 increments. This ranking is not independent across students: on average students
like the schools on the top more than the schools on the bottom. This means that the top
school (N in the figure) is more likely to have a high payoff both for you and for the other
students, and so on.
The ranking for each student is generated in this way. Schools in position 1 to 5 (ranked
from top to bottom) start with a common score of 12, 9, 6, 3, and 0 points, that is the same
for all the students. Then, each school receives a random score, uniformly distributed from
0 to 8. The random score is independent across students and across schools, and allows
different students to have different preferences over schools. Common and random scores
are summed, and the ranking is generated from the school with more points to the school
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with less points.
Computer program actions
At the beginning of each round, each computer program will choose an application list
and submit the same list for all 5 periods. Only human participants can review their own list
between periods.
If something is unclear, you can ask questions now. After answering your questions, we
can proceed with the first part.
Part II
The second half of the session consists of 8 Rounds, each divided into 5 Periods. The same
rules as Part I apply, with only a difference in how schools generate priority lists. You can
see on the main screen the interface for the second part.
At the beginning of each round, half of the students will be randomly assigned the color
orange, and the other half will be assigned the color blue. Your color is visible above the
school values, and will remain the same during the round, but your color might change
between rounds.
Schools are also randomly assigned to a color. There are three types of school colors:
2 orange schools, 2 blue schools, and 1 white school.
The color is used to fill the box with the school’s name and value.
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For each school, the probability of a student being among the top 4 positions of the priority
list depends on her color:
• Each orange student has a 30% probability of being among the top 4 positions in the
priority list of each orange school, 20% for the white school, and 10% for each blue
school.
• Each blue student has a 30% probability of being among the top 4 positions in the
priority list of each blue school, 20% for the white school, and 10% for each orange
school.
• A separate random draw will determine which students are among the top 4 positions
in each school’s priority list. The relative ranking of those 4 students will be random.
Similarly, the relative ranking of the students who will be ranked 5th, 6th, . . . will be
randomly generated.
How you value schools does not depend on your color, and values are generated as in part
1. As before, in each period you create your application list by clicking the school boxes.
Each round is comprised of 5 periods.
If something is unclear, you can ask questions now. After answering your questions, we
can proceed with the second part.
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2.6.2 Instructions for the Immediate Acceptance Mechanism
(Mechanism B)
All instructions, except for the description of the mechanism and the illustrating example (as
seen below), are identical to the instructions for the Deferred Acceptance mechanism.
Matching Algorithm B
The participants are assigned to schools by a multi-step algorithm.
Step 1:
• Each student applies to the school that is ranked first in her submitted application list.
• Each school accepts the applicants who have applied to it, one at a time, using the
school’s priority list and starting with the applicant with the highest priority. It does
so until it has admitted as many students as its capacity or runs out of applicants. The
remaining applicants (if any) are rejected by the school.
The accepted applicants and their seats are removed from the system: these are their
final acceptances.
Step 2, 3, ...: This step is only for the students who have been rejected in the previous step.
• Each of those students apply to the next school on their submitted application list. If
a student has already applied to all the schools in her application list, then that student
remains unassigned (and the algorithm ends for that student).
• If a school still has available seats remaining at the end of the previous step, then it
accepts the applicants who have applied to it, one at a time, using the school’s priority
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list and starting with the applicant with the highest priority. It does so until it has
admitted as many students as its capacity or runs out of applicants. The remaining
applicants (if any) are rejected by the school.
The accepted applicants and their seats are removed from the system: these are their
final acceptances.
End: The algorithm stops when either no school receives any applications, or no application
is rejected.
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Example (Mechanism B)
This is a small example that shows how the algorithm works. We consider
• 3 students: A, B and C
• 3 schools: 1, 2, and 3. Each school has 1 seat.
Schools’ priority lists of students are described in Table 2.5.
Table 2.5: Schools’ priority lists of students
Priority School 1 School 2 School 3
1st A A C
2nd C B B
3rd B C A
So, for instance, at school 3, student C is considered first, then B, then A.
The application lists submitted by the students are in Table 2.6.
Table 2.6: Students’ submitted application lists
Student A Student B Student C
1st application 1 1 2
2nd application 2 2 3
3rd application 3 3 1
So, for instance, student C will first apply to school 2. Then, if rejected, she will apply to
school 3. Finally, if rejected again, she will apply to school 1. The other students’ application
lists are read similarly.
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Let’s run the algorithm.
Step 1 Students A and B apply to school 1, and C applies to school 2.
• School 1 starts accepting the students who applied to it following the order given by its
priority. A is the top priority student, so she is accepted. School 1 cannot accept any
more student (it reached its capacity of 1), so B is rejected.
• The other student, C, applies to school 2. She is the only applicant, so she is accepted.
At the end of the first step, students A and C have received their final school acceptances: A
at school 1, and C at school 2. B is not accepted at any school. Both schools 1 and 2 have
reached full capacity whereas school 3 still has 1 empty seat.
Step 2 Student B applies to school 2.
• School 2 is already full, so B is rejected.
At the end of the second step, B is still not accepted at any school, and school 3 still has 1
empty seat.
Step 3 Student B applies to school 3.
• She is the only applicant, so she is accepted.
No student is rejected, so the algorithm stops.
The final assignment is
Student A Student B Student C
School 1 School 3 School 2
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CHAPTER 3: Participation in Extra
Classes in High School and Its Effect
on the College Entrance Examination
and Performance: Evidence from
Vietnam
3.1 Introduction
While preparations for high-stakes exams can be productive in improving students’ knowl-
edge and ability, there are concerns that such activities mostly involve “studying to the test” to
game the system. Moreover, intense preparations can be costly and, therefore, not affordable
for students of disadvantaged backgrounds, raising equity issues.
In the context of Vietnam, preparations for the national college entrance exam commonly
take the form of extra classes organized by individual teachers or cram schools. This paper
brings together survey data on the participation in extra classes of high school students and
administrative data on college admission and performance to address some of the the mat-
ters presented above. First, I document the pattern of participation in extra classes as well
as education expenditure of high school students across different demographics. Second, I
use the average of these educational investment measures at the local level to proxy for the
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investments that college students originating from the corresponding locality made during
high school. This allows me to quantify their effect on college entrance exam scores and
performance in college.
The educational investments observed in the Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey
in 2006 confirm the validity of the equity concerns. Students from higher-income households
have higher education expenditure and participation in extra classes (both at the extensive
and intensive margin). The effect is most notable in the differences between those from the
highest income quintile nationwide and the rest of the country. Minority and rural students
invest less than their non-minority and urban counterparts even after controlling for income.
I look at how these investments affect college admission and performance for the incom-
ing class of 2007 in a major engineering university in Vietnam. Only extra classes during
the school year and non-extra-class expenditure are productive in increasing college entrance
exam scores while the rest have no significant effects. Although urban students tend to do
better on the exam on average, this is fully captured through their higher investment in high
school. In terms of college performance, a higher entrance exam score leads to a slightly
higher grade point average at graduation, controlling for academic department fixed effects
and investments in high school. Given the inclusion of entrance exam scores as an explana-
tory variable, neither education expenditure nor participation in extra classes in high school
show any significant effects on college performance. However, this does not rule out the pos-
sibility that score inflation exists for the entrance exam but is canceled out due to correlations
between extra classes and omitted factors that improve college performance.
Throughout the analysis, there are persistent differences between genders. Female high
school students tend to receive more investments even though these investments are not
significantly more productive for them than for their male counterparts in raising college
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entrance exam scores. Given the same investments/preparations, females perform slightly
worse on the exam. However, conditional on the same entrance exam score, they outperform
their male peers in college.
To my knowledge, data on extra classes or tutoring are generally unavailable, and I will be
the first to document the pattern of participation in them across different demographics. Addi-
tionally, my paper contributes to the literature on education expenditure (Aslam and Kingdon,
2008; Azam and Kingdon, 2013; Acerenza and Gandelman, 2019). Among them, Acerenza
and Gandelman (2019) also find more investment in females at the secondary education level
in Latin American and Caribbean countries, similar to what I observe in Vietnam.
My paper is also related to the literature on the effect of admission test scores on college
performance. In the US context, Rothstein (2004) examines SAT using data from the Univer-
sity of California administrative records for 1996 (for student race, gender, SAT score, and
freshman GPA) and California public school records (for high school characteristics data).
The author criticizes the previous literature for omitted-variable bias and overstating the pre-
dictive power of SAT on college performance. In particular, he shows that the portion of SAT
score predicted by student- and high-school-level characteristics has more predictive power
than the residual. Furthermore, when characteristics are included as controls, the coefficient
of SAT score decreases compare to the more parsimonious model. In the context of the col-
lege entrance exam in China, which is more similar to Vietnam, Bai, Chi and Qian (2014)
consider two universities with very different rankings in China and find that coefficients for
total score are similar for the two universities, but the patterns for subject scores differ, which
the authors suggest is due to differences in the major compositions. Meanwhile, Yang (2014)
shows that at a national key university in China, the predictive power of subject tests differs
by admission track (humanities vs. science) and college major. The pattern is robust when
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personal characteristics and high school achievements are controlled for.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the setting and data. Sec-
tion 3 records the pattern of education expenditure and participation in extra classes of high
school students nationwide. Section 4 quantifies the effects of these educational investments
on college entrance exam scores and college performance. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Setting and Data
Grade 12 students in Vietnam need to complete a nationwide college entrance examination
in order to be considered for college admission. During the years for which I have data, this
examination was separate from and happened after the high school graduation examination.1
The set of subjects students needed to take depend on their specialization track; those apply-
ing to engineering universities were typically in track A (Mathematics, Physics, and Chem-
istry). Every track has three subjects, each graded on a ten-point scale. Additionally, students
may receive bonuses due to their disadvantaged background, such as living in remote areas
or being an ethnic minority.2 Admission is based solely on the total score, including bonuses.
Although the content of the exam for each subject was the same nationwide, students took
the exam at the university to which they were applying. Anecdotally, throughout high school,
most students, especially those in urban areas, attended extra classes organized by individual
teachers or cram schools in preparation for this exam. Private one-one-one tutoring was also
present, but less common. Both extra classes and tutoring were on a voluntary basis.
I have two main data sources: survey data on education expenditure and extra
1Since 2015, these two examinations have been combined.
2Any ethnicity except for Kinh and Hoa is considered a minority.
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classes/tutoring for high school students nationwide from from the General Statistics Of-
fice of Vietnam and administrative data on college admission and graduation from a major
university in Hanoi, Vietnam. Although the two student populations are distinct, average
expenditure and participation in extra classes/tutoring at the provincial level from the first
source can be used as proxies for actual values for incoming college students from the same
locality.
The data from the General Statistics Office of Vietnam comes from the education section
of the Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey in 2006 (VHLSS 2006), which was con-
ducted on a representative sample of households nationwide. The data I obtain consists of
10,877 students, which account for all high school students from the aforementioned house-
holds. For these students, I observe their individual answers to education survey questions as
well as the characteristics of their households. Important variables at the individual student
level includes total expenditure on education, expenditure on extra classes, and participation
in extra classes (dummy and frequencies) in the last 12 months, as well as the number of
years of participation since grade 1. Although there are similar questions on participation in
tutoring, the data is missing for a lot of students, and the majority of the non-missing data
indicates non-participation (which is consistent with anecdotal evidence). Therefore, for the
rest of the paper, I will concentrate only on extra classes.
The data from the engineering university covers the incoming class of 2007, including
two separate data sets: one on admission and one on graduation. The graduation data set
is digitalized from a physical archive and matched with the admission data set based on
students’ name, gender, and date of birth. I was able to match 58% of the admission data
to 68% of the graduation data, resulting in an analysis sample of 1477 students. In terms of
admission, I observe the score for each of 3 subjects (Maths, Physics, Chemistry) and the
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bonus (if any). In term of college performance, I observe Grade Point Average (GPA) at
the time of graduation, graduation grade (High Distinction/ Distinction/ Credit/ Strong Pass/
Pass), and the graduation date. Other variables include each students’ province, district/town,
high school during Grade 12, which allow me to match them with proxies for education
expenditure and extra class participation from VHLSS 2006. Due to the fact that I only have
access to admission and graduation data, there is selection into the sample. In particular, we
neither observe students who took the entrance exam but failed to gain admission, nor the
college performance of those who did not graduate.
3.3 Pattern of Education Expenditure and Participation
in Extra Classes
In this section, I examine the education expenditure and participation in extra classes across
demographics. Surprisingly, there is more investment in the education of female students
across all measures. As expected, students from higher-income households tend to receive
more educational investment, with those from the highest income quintile nationwide being
markedly different from the rest. Minority and rural students invest less than their non-
minority and urban counterparts even after controlling for income.
Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics for education expenditure and extra class participa-
tion for a subsample of 1487 high school students for which the information is available. Total
education expenditure for a student in the last 12 months is, on average, 1449.28 thousand
Vietnam dong (VND), which is approximately 1.8 times the average monthly total consump-
tion expenditures per capita in urban area and 3.6 times that in rural areas. 3 Expenditure
3On average, the biggest component of total education expenditure is tuition. The average monthly total con-
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on extra classes is 438.83 thousand VND and on average accounts for about 23% of total
education expenditure. Note there is a lot of variation in this particular type of expenditure
(the standard deviation is nearly twice the mean while its counterpart for total education ex-
penditure is lower than the mean). In the last 12 months, a substantial majority (86%) of
students participated in extra classes during the formal school year (from September to May,
excluding 1-2 week(s) of winter holidays). On average, a student is in extra classes for more
than half of the available weeks of the school year for nearly 8 hours per week. Participa-
tion in extra classes during school holidays (including winter and summer holidays) is more
moderate on both the extensive and intensive margins.
I consider the differences in the aforementioned variables across demographics by regress-
ing them on students’ and households’ characteristics, as seen in Table 3.2. Compared to
her male countepart, an average female student receives 103.02 thousand VND more in total
education expenditure, have attended extra classes for 0.29 more years since Grade 1, spends
more hours per week in extra classes both during the formal school year and school holidays.
The coefficients for female when expenditure on extra classes and on the number of weeks in
extra class during the school year are the dependent variables are also positive but insignifi-
cant. I explore the possibility that this pattern is true conditional of enrolling in high school,
but female may be less likely to enroll. However, among individuals at high school age (15-
18) who have not yet completed Grade 12 in the full VHLSS 2006 sample, the fractions who
have attended schools in the last 12 months are comparable for male and female (37.15% and
36.80%, respectively).
In terms of household income, several measures are included. Compared to a household in
the first income quintile nationwide, one in the fifth quintile spends 291.91 VND more on the
sumption expenditures per capita are 811.8 and 401.7 thousand VND for urban and rural areas, respectively.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics - Education expenditure and participation in extra classes in
the last 12 months
25th 75th
Mean SD Percentile Median Percentile
Total education expenditure (’000 VND) 1449.28 1211.23 802.50 1125.00 1633.50
expenditure on extra classes (’000 VND) 438.83 829.43 62.00 200.00 480.00
Extra classes as percentage of total expenditure (%) 23.43 19.95 7.71 20.31 34.72
Years of participation in extra classes since grade 1 4.96 3.00 3.00 4.00 7.00
During the formal school year:
Participated in extra classes 0.86 0.34 1.00 1.00 1.00
Number of weeks in extra classes 22.48 13.67 10.00 27.00 36.00
Number of hours per week in extra classes 7.81 6.31 4.00 6.00 10.00
During school holidays:
Participated in extra classes 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
Number of weeks in extra classes 4.04 4.41 0.00 3.00 8.00
Number of hours per week in extra classes 5.51 7.00 0.00 3.00 9.00
N 1487
Notes: Although there are 10,877 observations in the full sample of high school students in VHLSS 2006, I
have information on all of the variable listed above for a subsample of only 1487.
All expenditure are in 2006 currency.
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student’s education in total, most of which (214.95 VND) is attributable to expenditure on
extra classes. Students from fifth-quintile households also spend more time on extra classes
(1.35 more year since grade 1, 5.69 more weeks during the school year, 2.62 more weeks and
3.76 hours more per week during the holidays). Those in the middle quintiles do not differ
significantly from the lowest one, except for their more frequent participation in extra classes
during holidays. All else being equal (including being in the same quintile for total household
income), one extra dollar in income per member increases total education expenditure on the
high school student by 2 cents and expenditure on extra classes by 1 cent. The designation
of “poor household”, which is specific to the local level, offers additional information to the
previous income measures. Specifically, a poor household spends 227.78 VND less on the
student’s education and have had them attending extra classes for nearly one year fewer on
average than a similar household considered non-poor (which must be in a different location).
This is true when province fixed effects are already controlled for.
Even after accounting for household income in multiple ways, ethnic minorities invest
significantly less than non-minorities, and urban students invest significantly more than rural
students across the board. Meanwhile, given the controls, the effect of belonging to a larger
household is only significant for total expenditure and years of extra classes, with a relatively
small magnitude.
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3.4 Effect of Extra Classes
3.4.1 On College Entrance Examination
I find that only extra classes during the school year and non-extra-class expenditure other than
that on extra classes are productive in improving college entrance exam score. The advan-
tage of urban students disappears when educational investment is controlled for, and female
students consistently receive a lower score, conditional on the same amount of preparation.
Table 3.3 presents the results for four different linear regressions with total college entrance
exam score as the dependent variables. The effect of expenditure on extra classes on exam
score is a pretty precise zero while other education expenditure consistently raises score by
0.001 per thousand VND spent across specifications. Such expenditure includes tuition (and
extra tuition for attending non-neighborhood schools); contributions to school, class, and
parent funds; uniforms; textbooks and reference books; other stationery; and others. Extra
classes during the school year in the last 12 months increase exam score. In contrast, having
spent more years participating in extra classes or attending the during school holidays have
no significant effects.
The first specification shows that students from urban areas have a higher score than those
in rural areas on average, but the effect becomes insignificant once educational investments in
high school are controlled for. Regardless of which other explanatory variables are present,
female students score approximately 0.8 point lower on average compared to male students.
Given gender differential in educational investment recorded in the previous section, I also
test the hypothesis that these investments are more productive in increasing college entrance
exam scores for female students. To this end, I run another series of regressions (not presented
here) that additionally include interactions between gender and educational investment vari-
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Table 3.3: Linear Regression - Total college entrance exam score on students’ characteristics
and proxies for expenditure and extra classes (EC) in high school
Total College Entrance Exam Score (without bonus)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 21.503*** 20.691*** 18.893*** 20.424***
(0.070) (0.287) (0.714) (0.568)
Female -0.801*** -0.796*** -0.794*** -0.787***
(0.148) (0.147) (0.147) (0.148)
Urban 0.459*** 0.209 0.222 0.230
(0.129) (0.159) (0.163) (0.165)
Expenditure on EC 2.52E-04 -7.20E-05 -1.05E-05
(4.33E-04) (4.67E-04) (5.53E-04)
Other Education expenditure 0.001** 0.001** 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Years of EC -0.019 -0.061
(0.044) (0.064)
EC during school year (dummy) 2.120***
(0.749)
EC during school holidays (dummy) 0.197
(0.455)
EC during school year (weeks) 0.047**
(0.020)
EC during school year (hours/week) -0.041
(0.055)
EC during school holidays (weeks) -0.108
(0.137)
EC during school holidays (hours/week) 0.049
(0.077)
R-squared 0.023 0.029 0.034 0.033
N 1477 1476 1476 1476
Notes: The analysis sample includes all students that were matched between the admission and graduation data
for the incoming class of 2007 of a major engineering university in Hanoi, Vietnam. Expenditure and extra class
proxies are based on province-level average including high school students of all grades from VHLSS 2006.
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ables. However, none of these interactions have significant effects on exam score.
3.4.2 On College Performance
I study the effect of education expenditure and participation in extra classes in high school on
college performance. The focus is on Grade Point Average (GPA) at graduation as graduation
grade is simply a coarser version of the former variable.
Table 3.4 shows that a one-point increase in the total entrance exam score results in a slight
increase of 0.077-0.078 point in the graduation GPA. Female students consistently outdo male
students with similar observables by nearly 1 point (out of 10) across the different specifica-
tions. This is true when selection into different academic departments and the difficulty of
the associated curriculum are both controlled for through department fixed effects. Given the
controls, being from an urban area does not make any difference on performance.
Once college entrance exam scores, which are affected by extra classes in high school, are
accounted for, there may still be two additional effects operating in opposite directions. On
the one hand, extra classes may involve studying to the test that inflate exam scores without
improving actual ability, resulting in a negative coefficient. On the other hand, extra classes,
while not actually productive, may be correlated to omitted variables that do promote perfor-
mance in college, resulting in a positive coefficent. In this case, neither the extra class nor
expenditure variables have significant coefficients. Unfortunately, with the current data, I am
unable to distinguish between two possible scenarios: 1) any influence of high school educa-
tion expenditure and participation in extra classes only operates through what is captured in
the entrance exam score, or 2) the two opposing effects outlined earlier are both present and
cancel out each other.
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Table 3.4: Linear Regression - Graduation GPA on students’ characteristics and proxies for
expenditure and extra class (EC) in high school
Graduation Grade Point Average (out of 10)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 6.651*** 6.683*** 6.800*** 6.604***
(0.027) (0.068) (0.221) (0.170)
College Entrance Exam Score 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.077***
(total without bonus) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Female 0.809*** 0.808*** 0.808*** 0.810***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Urban 0.012 -0.001 -0.011 -0.013
(0.035) (0.044) (0.045) (0.046)
Expenditure on EC 9.81E-05 1.41E-04 -2.12E-05
(1.13E-04) (1.23E-04) (1.46E-04)
Other Education expenditure -6.75E-05 -5.55E-05 -1.11E-04
(8.35E-05) (8.43E-05) (8.51E-05)
Years of EC -0.005 0.003
(0.010) (0.016)
EC during school year (dummy) -0.069
(0.218)
EC during school holidays (dummy) -0.103
(0.117)
EC during school year (weeks) 0.002
(0.005)
EC during school year (hours/week) 0.012
(0.018)
EC during school holidays (weeks) 0.057
(0.037)
EC during school holidays (hours/week) -0.036
(0.020)
Department FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.312 0.312 0.313 0.314
N 1477 1476 1476 1476
Notes: The analysis sample includes all students that were matched between the admission and graduation data
for the incoming class of 2007 of a major engineering university in Hanoi, Vietnam. Expenditure and extra class
proxies are based on province-level average including high school students of all grades from VHLSS 2006.
Total score on college entrance exam is centered at the sample average. Department fixed effects indicate which
academic department the students belong too, which is coarser than major.
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3.5 Conclusion
This paper documents the pattern in educational investments (education expenditure and par-
ticipation in extra classes) of high school students and their effects on performance on the
college entrance exam and in college. In terms of educational investments, I use survey data
from the Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey in 2006. In terms of college data, I
consider the incoming class of 2007 in a major engineering university in Vietnam. The in-
vestments these college students made in high school are proxied by the average investments
of their peers from the same locality.
As expected, high school students from more advantageous backgrounds invest more.
Those with larger household income, especially the highest income quintile nationwide, have
higher education expenditure and participation in extra classes (both at the extensive and in-
tensive margin). Minority and rural students invest less than their non-minority and urban
counterparts even after controlling for income.
In terms of improving college entrance exam scores, extra classes are only effective dur-
ing the school year but not during the school holiday. Expenditure on extra classes has no
significant effects, while other education expenditure does promote scores. Although urban
students tend to do better on the exam on average, this is fully captured through their higher
investment in high school. In college, a higher entrance exam score leads to a slightly higher
grade point average at graduation. Controlling for entrance exam scores, all measures of ed-
ucational investment in high school show no significant effects on college performance, but
there still exists the possibility of opposing effects offsetting one another.
An important limitation of the paper is due to data restrictions. There is selection into the
sample of college students in two aspects. First, it only includes students who successfully
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gain admission to the college. Second, college performance is only observed for graduat-
ing students. Aside from selection, this also means that intermediate performance measures
during college remain unobserved. Despite this, the data set can still be improved in other
dimensions. The size of the matched sample between admission and graduation data can be
increased (the selection into matched vs. unmatched is due to digitalization glitches and pre-
sumably independent of any variables of interest). Furthermore, information on the majors
of individual students (finer categories than academic departments) can also be obtained.
119
Bibliography
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, Nikhil Agarwal, and Parag A. Pathak. 2017. “The Welfare Ef-
fects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match.”
American Economic Review, 107(12): 3635–3689. Working Paper.
Acerenza, Santiago, and Nestor Gandelman. 2019. “Household education spending in latin
america and the caribbean: Evidence from income and expenditure surveys.” Education
Finance and Policy, 14(1): 61–87. cited By 1.
Arcidiacono, Peter, and Michael Lovenheim. 2016. “Affirmative Action and the Quality-Fit
Trade-off.” Journal of Economic Literature, 54(1): 3–51.
Arcidiacono, Peter, Michael Lovenheim, and Maria Zhu. 2015. “Affirmative Action in
Undergraduate Education.” Annual Review of Economics, 7: 487–518.
Artemov, Georgy, Yeon-Koo Che, and Yinghua He. 2020. “Stragic ’Mistakes’: Implica-
tions for Market Design Research.” Working Paper.
Aslam, Monazza, and Geeta Gandhi Kingdon. 2008. “Gender and household education
expenditure in Pakistan.” Applied Economics, 40(20): 2573–2591.
Azam, Mehtabul, and Geeta Gandhi Kingdon. 2013. “Are Girls the Fairer Sex in India?




Bai, Chongen, Wei Chi, and Xiaoye Qian. 2014. “Do College Entrance Examination Scores
Predict Undergraduate GPAs? A Tale Of Two Universities.” China Economic Review,
30: 632 – 647.
Beggs, S., S. Cardell, and J. Hausman. 1981. “Assessing The Potential Demand For Electric
Cars.” Journal of Econometrics, 16: 1–19.
Bo, Inacio, and Rustamdjan Hakimov. 2020. “Iterative versus standard deferred accep-
tance: Experimental evidence.” The Economic Journal, 130: 356–392.
Calsamiglia, Caterina, Guillaume Haeringer, and Flip Klijn. 2010. “Constrained school
choice: An experimental study.” American Economic Review, 100: 1860–1874.
Calsamiglia, Caterina, Guillaume Haeringer, and Flip Klijn. 2011. “A comment on
âSchool choice: An experimental study." [J. Econ. Theory 127 (1) (2006) 202-231].” Jour-
nal of Economic Theory, 146: 392–396.
Chen, Yan, and Onur Kesten. 2019. “Chinese college admissions and school choice re-
forms: An experimental study.” Games and Economic Behavior, 115: 83–100.
Chen, Yan, and Tayfun Sonmez. 2006. “School choice: An experimental study.” Journal of
Economic Theory, 127: 202–231.
Corcoran, Sean P., and Christy Baker-Smith. 2018. “Pathways to an Elite Education: Ap-
plication, Admission, and Matriculation to New York City’s Specialized High Schools.”
Education Finance and Policy, 13(2): 256–279.
121
Bibliography
Ding, Tingting, and Andrew Schotter. 2017. “Matching and chatting: An experimental
study of the impact of network communication on school-matching mechanisms.” Games
and Economic Behavior, 103: 94–115.
Ding, Tingting, and Andrew Schotter. 2019. “Learning and mechanism design: An experi-
mental test of school matching mechanisms with intergenerational advice.” The Economic
Journal, 129: 2779–2804.
Dogan, Battal. 2016. “Responsive affirmative action in school choice.” Journal of Economic
Theory, 165: 69–105.
Dogan, Battal, and M. Bumin Yenmez. 2018. “Unified Versus Divided Enrollment In
School Choice: Improving Student Welfare In Chicago.” Working Paper.
Dubins, Lester E., and David A. Freeman. 1981. “Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algo-
rithm.” American Mathematical Monthly, 88(7): 485–494.
Dur, Umut, Parag A. Pathak, and Tayfun Sonmez. 2016. “Explicit vs. Statistical Targeting
in Affirmative Action: Theory and Evidence from Chicago’s Exam Schools.” Working
Paper.
Dur, Umut, Robert G. Hammond, and Thayer Morrill. 2019. “The secure Boston mech-
anism: Theory and experiments.” Experimental Economics, 22: 918–953.
Dur, Umut, Scott Duke Kominers, Parag A. Pathak, and Tayfun Sonmez. 2017. “Reserve




Ellison, Glenn, and Parag A. Pathak. 2016. “The Efficiency of Race-Neutral Alternatives
to Race-Based Affirmative Action: Evidence from Chicago’s Exam Schools.” Working
Paper.
Fack, Gabrielle, Julien Grenet, and Yinghua He. 2019. “Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference
Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions.” American Economic
Review, 109(4): 1486–1529.
Gale, D., and L. S. Shapley. 1962. “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage.”
American Mathematical Monthly, 69(1): 9–15.
Guillen, Pablo, and Alexander Hing. 2014. “Lying through their teeth: Third party advice
and truth telling in a strategy proof mechanism.” European Economic Review, 70: 178–
185.
Haeringer, Guillaume, and Flip Klijn. 2009. “Constrained School Choice.” Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 144(5): 1921–1947.
Hahm, Dong Woo. 2019. “What Makes NYC Specialized High Schools So Special?: Relat-
ing School Effectiveness and Student Preferences.” Working Paper.
Hakimov, Rustamdjan, and Dorothea Kubler. 2019. “Experiments on Matching Markets:
a Survey.” Working Paper.
Hausman, Jerry A., and Paul A. Ruud. 1987. “Specifying And Testing Econometric Mod-
els For Rank-ordered Data.” Journal of Econometrics, 34: 83–104.




Kojima, Fuhito. 2012. “School choice: Impossibilities for affirmative action.” Games and
Economic Behavior, 75: 685–693.
Manjunatha, Vikram, and Bertan Turhan. 2016. “Two School Systems, One District:
What To Do When A Unified Admissions Process Is Impossible.” Games and Economic
Behavior, 95: 25–40.
Pais, Joana, and Agnes Pinter. 2008. “School choice and information: An experimental
study on matching mechanisms.” Games and Economic Behavior, 64: 303–328.
Roth, Alvin E. 1982. “The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives.” Mathematics
of Operation Research, 7(4): 617–628.
Rothstein, Jesse M. 2004. “College Performance Predictions and the SAT.” Journal of
Econometrics, 121: 297 – 317.
Shapiro, Eliza. 2019. “Only 7 Black Students Got Into Stuyvesant, N. Y.’s Most Selective
High School, Out of 895 Spots.”
Treschan, Lazar. 2015. “The Specialized High School Admissions Debate: Moving from
Rhetoric to a Research-Based Solution.” Community Service Society of New York.
Turhan, Bertan. 2019. “Welfare And Incentives In Partitioned School Choice Markets.”
Games and Economic Behavior, 113: 199–208.
Yang, Guangliang. 2014. “Are All Admission Sub-tests Created Equal? - Evidence From A
National Key University In China.” China Economic Review, 30: 600 – 617.
124
